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PROTECTING FREEDOM OF TESTATION: A PROPOSAL
FOR LAW REFORM
Eike G. Hosemann*
This Article addresses a problem ever more pressing in wealthy and aging societies
like the United States: interference with freedom of testation by the use of wrongful
means such as undue influence or will forgery to acquire benefits through inheri-
tance. A detailed analysis of the remedies against interference with freedom of
testation under inheritance law, tort law, and equity reveals that there is currently
a significant under-deterrence of this undesirable behavior. Hence, this Article pro-
poses a new remedy in order to protect freedom of testation more effectively: a
disinheritance statute barring wrongdoers that have infringed upon someone’s free-
dom of testation from inheriting from their victims, not unlike the slayer statutes
adopted by many state legislators in order to deal with “murdering heirs.” This
statutory prohibition against inheritance in cases of interference with freedom of
testation would do more than alleviate the identified under-deterrence problem. The
proposed legislative reform would also conform with an important principle of
American law: the idea that no one should profit from his wrongdoing. In addi-
tion, arguments in favour of the suggested proposal can be made by reference to the
general trend towards a behavior-based inheritance regime and in view of the avail-
ability of similar rules in jurisdictions outside the United States.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
I. THE WRONG: INTERFERENCE WITH FREEDOM OF
TESTATION DEFINED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
A. The Wrongful Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
B. The Effects of the Wrongful Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
II. THE EXISTING REMEDIES—WHY THEY ARE NOT
SATISFACTORY WITH REGARD TO DETERRENCE . . . . . . . . . . 430
A. Will Contests and Their Deficiencies in Terms of
Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
* LL.M. (Harvard). Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany. This Article originates from the author’s
LL.M. thesis written in conjunction with the Private Law Workshop at Harvard Law School in
spring 2012. The author is indebted to his supervisors, John C.P. Goldberg and Henry E.
Smith, for their advice. The author would also like to thank Michael Friedman, Nina Marie
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INTRODUCTION
Heredis fletus sub persona risus est. According to a Latin aphorism,
the weeping of an heir is nothing more than laughter under a
mask.1 One explanation for this cynical view of survivors’ grief is
1. See PUBLILII SYRI SENTENTIAE 16 (R. A. H. Bickford-Smith ed., C. J. Clay & Sons 1895).
In academic writings today, the term “laughing heir” is used specifically to designate heirs
that are so loosely linked to the testator that they suffer no sense of bereavement. Cf. David F.
Cavers, Change in the American Family and the “Laughing Heir”, 20 IOWA L. REV. 203, 208 (1935)
(introducing the term by reference to the German phrase “der lachende Erbe”); David V. DeR-
osa, Note, Intestate Succession and the Laughing Heir: Who Do We Want to Get the Last Laugh?, 12
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that the acquisition of property through inheritance was an impor-
tant source of individual wealth in ancient Rome2—just as it is today
in the United States.3 In the United States, like in many other juris-
dictions,4 freedom of testation underlies the allocation of a person’s
property upon death, giving the owner the right to designate bene-
ficiaries.5 The less restricted this right is, the more potential there is
for disappointment. Relatives and friends hoping to receive a share
of the deceased’s estate might suddenly find themselves empty-
handed because the testator6 revised his plans, or because he never
intended to leave them anything in the first place. It is this uncom-
fortable situation—facing the chance of an increase in personal
wealth, yet being at the whim of the testator—that sometimes leads
to drastic action. Some people forge, destroy, or suppress wills, or
deceive, unduly influence, or threaten the testator into making a
will in their favor.
It is evident that such behavior—herein called “interference with
freedom of testation” and described in more detail later7—is
wrong, irrespective of whether one adopts a welfarist or rights-based
point of view.8 Moreover, there is reason to assume that, in a
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 153, 157 (1997) (stating that it was Cavers who brought the term into
popular use in the United States).
2. Even absent concrete socio-economic data, it seems that one can infer the impor-
tance of inherited wealth in ancient Rome from the fact that Roman elites were obsessed with
the making of wills. Cf. Thomas Rüfner, Testamentary Formalities in Roman Law, in 1 COMPARA-
TIVE SUCCESSION LAW: TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES 1, 2 (Kenneth G. C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2011).
3. See Michael Doran, Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 61 TAX L. REV. 241,
261 (2008) (reporting that, according to some estimates, inherited wealth represents as
much as eighty percent of total private assets in the United States); see also JENS BECKERT,
INHERITED WEALTH 14–16 (Thomas Dunlap trans., 2008) (presenting different figures con-
cerning the total amount of wealth passed on each year and concerning the question what
share of private wealth is based on inheritance).
4. See, e.g., Marius J. de Waal, Comparative Succession Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1071, 1084 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006)
(“There can be no doubt that all developed systems of testate succession are based on the
premise of freedom of testation . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 976 n. 24
(1999); see also Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 6 n. 16 (1992) (pointing out that freedom of testation must be distinguished from
freedom of inheritance, i.e. the right of an owner at death to not have his property confis-
cated by the state).
6. The term “testator” is often understood to refer exclusively to a (male) person who
has executed a will. Throughout this Article, however, the term is used generically to refer-
ence a male or female decedent whose estate is at issue, irrespective of whether he or she dies
testate or intestate.
7. See infra Part I.
8. From a rights-based perspective, the undesirability of this behavior follows simply
from the fact that it violates the legal right of the testator to freely choose the beneficiaries of
his property. From a welfarist perspective, the undesirability of interference with freedom of
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wealthy and aging society such as the United States, interferences
with freedom of testation will become more frequent in the future.
First, because the next years will witness a giant intergenerational
transfer of wealth,9 large sums could be gained from this kind of
undesirable behavior. Second, because the population is aging and
the elderly tend to be particularly vulnerable to behavior like un-
due influence, there will be more opportunities for interference
with freedom of testation.10
Against this background, the question of how interference with
freedom of testation can be effectively remedied is a pressing one.
Recently, it has received increased academic attention because of
the rise of the tort for wrongful interference with inheritance.11
Under this remedy, “[o]ne who by fraud, duress or other tortious
means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third
person an inheritance . . . that he would otherwise have received is
subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance . . . .”12
testation can be explained by reference to the costs of rent-seeking and rent-avoidance that
are typically associated with it. Think, for example, of the resources that an interferor has to
spend if he wants to find the testator’s will in order to secretly destroy it. These resources are
wasted from society’s perspective. They do not create welfare for anyone. A similar waste of
resources occurs if the testator, knowing of the possibility that his will might be destroyed by
a disappointed descendant, takes special precautionary measures against such an act of inter-
ference, for example by buying a safe in which he places his will. These precautionary costs
would be unnecessary in a perfect world (where wills are not suppressed), and thus they also
waste resources. For a similar welfarist explanation of the undesirability of theft, see Richard
L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 367 (1997).
9. See, e.g., METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST., THE METLIFE STUDY OF INHERITANCE AND
WEALTH TRANSFER TO BABY BOOMERS 2 (2010), available at https://www.metlife.com/assets/
cao/mmi/publications/studies/2010/mmi-inheritance-wealth-transfer-baby-boomers.pdf
(estimating that the baby-boom generation will receive inheritances of six trillion dollars in
the future).
10. See, e.g., Kenneth I. Shulman et al., Assessment of Testamentary Capacity and Vulnerability
to Undue Influence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 722, 723–24 (2007) (stating that older adults are
particularly likely to suffer from cognitive impairment and dementia and that these factors
cause particular vulnerability to undue influence).
11. For a detailed historic account of the rise of the wrongful interference with inheri-
tance tort, see John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful
Interference with Inheritance 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 355–65 (2013).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979). Classifying the tort as a remedy
against interference with freedom of testation might be considered controversial, given that
the focus of the tort seems to be not on the wrong committed against the testator but rather
on the wrong committed against the would-be beneficiary. Of course, both issues are inextri-
cably linked. Hence, some conceptualize the tort as a claim derivative of the decedent’s
rights, others as a primary claim of the disappointed beneficiary. See Diane J. Klein, The Disap-
pointed Heir’s Revenge, Southern Style: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey
with Analysis of State Approaches in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 79, 88–89 n.
12 (2003) [hereinafter Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits]. For a criticism of both conceptualiza-
tions of the tort, see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 379–88.
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Hardly recognized three decades ago, this remedy against interfer-
ence with freedom of testation is now available in almost two dozen
states13 and is also the subject of academic controversy.14 One rea-
son for recognizing this tort is that antisocial conduct, like undue
influence, should be deterred more effectively.15 Some argue that
the traditional remedies against interference with freedom of testa-
tion—the probate will contest and the equitable action for
restitution by way of a constructive trust—do not deter this kind of
undesirable behavior sufficiently. Critics of the tort, however, hold
the view that, rather than recognizing a conceptually flawed new
tort, the under-deterrence problem should be tackled by reforming
the existing remedies against interference with freedom of
testation.16
This Article argues that both supporters and critics of the “new”
tort for wrongful interference with inheritance are slightly mistaken
when it comes to the question of how antisocial conduct directed at
13. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 361–62 (reporting that the tort has now
been accepted in twenty-one states). An extensive state-by-state analysis of the recognition of
the interference tort has previously been undertaken by Diane J. Klein. See Diane J. Klein,
Revenge of the Disappointed Heir: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with
Analysis of State Approaches in the Fourth Circuit, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 259 (2002) [hereinafter
Klein, Fourth Circuit]; Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, supra note 12; Diane J. Klein, A Disap-
pointed Yankee in Connecticut (or Nearby) Probate Court: Tortious Interference with Expectation of
Inheritance—A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the First, Second, and Third Circuits, 66
U. PITT. L. REV. 235 (2004) [hereinafter Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits]; Diane J.
Klein, River Deep, Mountain High, Heir Disappointed: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheri-
tance—A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the Mountain States, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 1
(2008) [hereinafter Klein, Mountain States]; Diane J. Klein, “Go West, Disappointed Heir”: Tor-
tious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the
Pacific States, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 209 (2009) [hereinafter Klein, Pacific States].
14. For a powerful doctrinal attack on the tort both from the perspective of tort law and
inheritance law, see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11. See also Klein, Mountain States, supra
note 13, at 2–3 (“To some . . . commentators, the need for such a cause of action is obvious
and acute . . . To others, the tort is an improper, unnecessary incursion on the probate
court’s special procedures and evidentiary requirements . . . .”).
15. Cf., e.g., Irene D. Johnson, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of Inheritance or Gift—
Suggestions for Resort to the Tort, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 769, 774 (2008) (stating that the possibility
of attorneys’ fees being assessed as damages in tort and the availability of punitive damages
might deter potential interferors); Klein, Fourth Circuit, supra note 13, at 267–68 (stating that
a tort approach may seem clearly preferable to a probate system in terms of deterrence);
Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits, supra note 13, at 239 (arguing that traditional remedies
against interference with freedom of testation are deficient because they do not “deter cer-
tain tort defendants”); Marianna R. Chaffin, Comment, Stealing the Family Farm: Tortious
Interference with Inheritance, 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 73, 95 (2004); Rachel A. Orr, Com-
ment, Intentional Interference with an Expected Inheritance: The Only Valid Expectancy for Arkansas
Heirs is to Expect Nothing, 64 ARK. L. REV. 747, 747 (2011) (arguing for a recognition of this
tort in Arkansas because “[e]quity requires a system of deterrence for those who might
wrongfully interfere with [the testator’s] wishes”).
16. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 391–92 (arguing that courts should consider
reforming probate practice and restitution actions).
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the decedent’s freedom of disposition should be deterred. Al-
though traditional remedies against interference with freedom of
testation—will contests and constructive trusts—are unsatisfactory
from the point of view of deterrence,17 neither a legislative reform
of the “old” remedies nor the “new” tort remedy will solve the prob-
lem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom of
testation.18 This Article thus presents a novel solution to the under-
deterrence problem: the adoption of a statutory bar from inheri-
tance modeled after the existing “slayer statutes” addressing the
problem of the “murdering heir.”19 Such a remedy would not only
alleviate the problem of under-deterrence of interference with free-
dom of testation; it would also conform with basic notions of justice
underlying U.S. succession law.20
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I pro-
vides a definition of interference with freedom of testation and
presents an effect-based taxonomy of this kind of wrongful behav-
ior. Part II examines the existing remedies against this behavior
from the point of view of deterrence. Part III explains how a statu-
tory bar from inheritance would alleviate the current problem of
under-deterrence, presents additional arguments in favor of such a
legislative reform, anticipates possible criticism, and defends the
proposed solution against it.
I. THE WRONG: INTERFERENCE WITH FREEDOM
OF TESTATION DEFINED
This Part focuses on the wrong for which this Article will eventu-
ally propose a novel remedy: interference with freedom of testation.
It begins by offering a definition of the wrongful behavior. Next, it
will look more closely to the effects of this behavior and, on that
basis, distinguish between six standard cases of interference with
freedom of testation. This effect-based taxonomy shall later serve as
a basis for the analysis of the existing remedies against interference
with freedom of testation.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
WINTER 2014] Protecting Freedom of Testation 425
A. The Wrongful Behavior
Freedom of testation has been described as the “first principle”
of U.S. succession law.21 It reflects the commitment of American law
to a conception of rights as instruments for promoting individual
autonomy.22 Even though its precise definition is subject to debate,
there is little doubt on what autonomy is essentially about. Origi-
nally referring to the self-rule of Greek city-states, the term
autonomy, if applied to individuals, is understood today as the abil-
ity of a person to act “freely in accordance with a self-chosen
plan.”23 By allowing testators to decide how their property will be
distributed upon death, the law of wills provides an important op-
portunity to exercise self-determination in that sense.24
Not every decision of an individual, however, can be called au-
tonomous. For a decision to qualify, two conditions are commonly
21. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,
491 (1975); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a. (2003) (“The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is free-
dom of disposition.”); Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 341.
22. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 611
(1988) (stating that the American property law system “reinforces the classical liberal concep-
tion of rights as instruments for promoting individual autonomy”); Hernandez, supra note 5,
at 976 (“The law of wills focuses upon the individual to provide a decedent with autonomy in
keeping with the individualism of the Western concept of property . . . . ”); Bruce J. Winick,
On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1754 (1992) (“The laws
of property and of trusts and estates are also based on individual autonomy.”). For an essay
that puts the “Classical Legal Thought” conception of rights as instruments for defining
“spheres of autonomy” into a broad historical perspective, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Global-
izations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). For an account of a
justification of freedom of testation on different grounds, see Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An
Introduction to Chapters 1–4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 6 (Edward C. Halbach,
Jr. ed., 1977) (presenting a justification of freedom of testation with a view to the incentives it
sets for the testator).
23. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 99
(6th ed. 2009); cf. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, In Defense of Autonomy: An Ethic of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 548, 555–71 (2008) (giving a detailed account of the concept of autonomy as devel-
oped in Western liberal thought on basis of Kant’s philosophy).
24. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-In Will Forms–The First Decade: Theoretical Con-
structs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 779 (1993) (stating that “[e]state planning
. . . permits persons to exercise increased self-determination”); Mark Glover, A Therapeutic
Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 444 (2012) (stating that
the doctrine of freedom of testation “fosters the testator’s autonomy by allowing him to make
significant decisions concerning the distribution of his estate”); Winick, supra note 22, at
1754 (“The laws of property and of trusts and estates are also based on individual autonomy.
These areas of law are premised on the notion that individuals may exercise substantial con-
trol over the use and enjoyment of their property and may determine what shall be done with
it during their lives and upon their deaths.”).
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considered essential. First, the individual must be mentally compe-
tent to make an autonomous choice (one can speak of “agency”).25
Second, he or she must be free from controlling influences of
others (one can speak of “liberty”).26 The prerequisites of agency
and liberty are embodied in several legal concepts relating to the
writing of wills. The requirement that the testator be of “sound
mind” in order to execute a valid will27 reflects the requirement of
agency. The requirement that the will not be subject to undue in-
fluence, duress, or fraud28 reflects the requirement of liberty.
Interference with freedom of testation occurs whenever, from a
legal point of view, a third party infringes upon the testator’s auton-
omy. Consequently, it comprises the just-mentioned group of cases
where, as a result of duress, fraud, or undue influence, the testator
is under the controlling influence of another person (this may be
called “heteronomy”).29 In addition to these types of behavior, two
other kinds of wrongs also have to be included in the definition of
interference with freedom of testation: the forgery of wills and their
suppression. In contrast to the aforementioned behaviors, the for-
gery of wills and their suppression are not directed at the testator
himself. Rather, these acts can take place without any contact be-
tween the wrongdoer and the decedent. Their effect, however, if
successfully undertaken, is not in any respect different from that of
the first type of attack on the testator’s autonomy. If a forged will is
executed, or if intestacy rules apply as a result of the suppression of
the proper will of the testator, the property distribution upon the
decedent’s death does not reflect his actual intent. In the following
sections, wrongful interference with freedom of testation will in-
clude will forgery, will suppression, fraud, undue influence, and
duress (if directed at a testator).
Applying these doctrines may of course prove tremendously diffi-
cult in practice. In particular, the concept of “undue influence” has
25. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 23, at 100.
26. See id.; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 2, topic
2, intro. note (2011) (“[T]ransactional autonomy requires that a transferor’s consent to a
transfer be both competent and legitimately obtained.”).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. c
(2003).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(a)
(2003).
29. It seems that the term “heteronomy” has so far not been used to define interference
with freedom of testation. For this purpose, I suggest using it in the broad sense of being
under the controlling influence by another party and not in the specific sense given to it by
Kant. See generally Simon Blackburn, autonomy/heteronomy, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHI-
LOSOPHY 31 (1994) (noting that heteronomy generally occurs when one’s will is controlled by
another, while Kant specifically refers to heteronomy as “the condition of acting on desires
[that] are not legislated by reason”).
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proven notoriously problematic in litigation and is therefore sub-
ject to sharp academic criticism.30 For the definition of interference
with freedom of testation in the abstract, however, these practical
difficulties in drawing the line between autonomy and heteronomy
do not matter. Not unlike the prerequisite that the testator be men-
tally competent, the requirement that the testator not be subjected
to undue influence, duress, or fraud in order for a will to be valid is
indispensable for a will to be the product of the testator’s
autonomy.
B. The Effects of the Wrongful Behavior
In the definition of interference with freedom of testation of-
fered, the outcome of such misconduct has only been described in
the most general terms: the replacement of the testator’s autonomy
by heteronomy. This description does not fully account for impor-
tant differences in the possible effects of wrongful interference.
These differences result from the fact that anyone considering in-
terfering with another’s freedom of testation will adapt his behavior
with reference to three important factors: (1) whether the testator
has already executed a valid will; (2) whether, if already in exis-
tence, the executed will is in the potential wrongdoer’s favor; and
(3) whether the testator is satisfied with the current status of his
dispositions or plans to change it. These factors not only determine
whether or not it makes sense for the potential wrongdoer to inter-
fere with the testator’s freedom but also have an influence on what
he will aim to do. For example, they will impact whether he will try
to cause the testator to execute a new will or keep the existing will.
Building on these insights, six standard cases of interference with
freedom of testation can be identified.31
In the first case, the wrongdoer (hereinafter “interferor”), by
means of fraud, duress, or undue influence, induces the execution
30. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 180 (8th ed. 2009) (“one of the most bothersome concepts in all the law”); Ronald J.
Scalise, Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 41, 54 (2008) (“elusive”); Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influ-
ence Should be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 245 (2010) (“fails to meet any standard of
clarity, fairness, or predictability”).
31. For a similar taxonomy, see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 184 cmt. a (1937) (dis-
tinguishing between seven cases); Reinhard Zimmermann, “Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam
condicionem facere potest” Kränkungen der Testierfreiheit des Erblassers – englisches im Vergleich zum
kontinentaleuropäischen Recht, in 1 UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND VERANTWORTUNG, FESTSCHRIFT
FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24. AUGUST 2010, at 269 (Stefan Grundmann et
al. eds., 2010) [in German] (distinguishing between five cases).
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of a new will in his favor (or in favor of a third person32 whom the
interferor wants to benefit).33 Any will that the testator executed
before forming the new will is likely treated as revoked insofar as it
is inconsistent with the new will.34
The second case is in effect quite similar. Here, the interferor,
instead of wrongfully inducing the testator to execute a will in his
favor, decides to forge a will that designates the interferor as an
heir.35 The result, if the interferor’s plan is successful,36 is a written
document appearing as if it represents the testator’s free volition
when in fact it expresses the interferor’s wishes.
In the third case, the interferor’s behavior is not directed at the
production of a new document purporting to represent the testa-
tor’s free volition. Rather, it is directed at a document that already
exists. Here, the interferor uses fraud, duress, or undue influence
to induce the testator to revoke his will. Of course, such behavior
makes sense only in cases where the mere revocation of the existing
will is going to benefit the interferor. This requires either that he
would receive a share of the testator’s estate under the respective
jurisdiction’s intestacy laws37 or that there exists still another will
that is beneficial to the interferor that will now be treated as if it
were the final will of the testator.38
In the fourth case, the departure point is usually the same as in
the previous case. The interferor realizes that the testator has al-
ready executed an unfavorable will, but instead of wrongfully
inducing the testator to revoke it, the interferor destroys or hides
32. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed in the following that the interferor acts
for his own benefit. Where interference for the benefit of a third party requires a different
legal analysis, this will be pointed out explicitly. See infra note 97.
33. See, e.g., In re Nutt’s Estate, 185 P. 393 (Cal. 1919) (testatrix’s physician withheld
from her the information that she would die soon and thus brought her to execute a will in
favor of the physician’s husband in return for a promise to provide care of her during her
remaining lifetime). In re Nutt’s Estate is cited in the reporter’s notes as the basis for RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 illus. 6 (2003).
34. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a)(1) (2010). On the problem of revocation of wills
by inconsistency, see also DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 30, at 286–87.
35. See, e.g., King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App. 1987) (awarding damages for
tortious interference with inheritance on basis that decedent’s widow had forged will).
36. Whether will forgery is an option for the interferor will particularly depend on the
testamentary formalities in the respective jurisdiction. Where private wills have to be attested
by witnesses, forgery seems much harder than in jurisdictions that allow for holographic (i.e.
handwritten) wills. For more on testamentary formalities in the United States, see Ronald J.
Scalise, Jr., Testamentary Formalities in the United States of America, in 1 COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION
LAW: TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 2, at 357.
37. In this case, the interferor would be an “heir apparent.” Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 cmt. d. (1999).
38. See, e.g., Griffin v. Baucom, 328 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (concerning evidence
that decedent’s wife, dissatisfied with her husband’s will, unduly induced him to destroy it so
that his estate passed entirely to her).
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the will.39 Again, such a plan will only be attractive if there is any-
thing to be gained from the application of the respective
jurisdiction’s intestacy laws or the probation of a previous will.
In the fifth case, the circumstances are quite different. The in-
terferor is satisfied with the status quo but realizes that the testator
intends to execute a will that would be disadvantageous to him.
Thus, he uses wrongful means—i.e. fraud, duress, or undue influ-
ence—in order to prevent the testator from executing the will as
intended.40
The sixth case is only a slight variation, in which the interferor
wrongfully prevents the decedent not from executing a new will but
from revoking an existing one.41 The goal of the interferor is the
same as in the previous case: preserving the existing estate plan of
the decedent against the latter’s will.
It is these six cases of interference with freedom of testation that
shall serve as the basis for an analysis of the existing remedies
against interference with freedom of testation. As shall be demon-
strated, some of them cause greater difficulties for courts and
legislators than others. One evident difficulty, however, is common
to most cases of interference with freedom of testation: as a result
of the wrongdoing, it is often almost impossible to establish with
certainty the testator’s true intent. Only the testator himself could
authoritatively answer the question of how he would have exercised
his freedom of testation if he had not been threatened, deceived, or
unduly influenced.42 Given that litigation over interference with
39. See, e.g., In re Robinson’s Estate, 270 P. 1020 (Wash. 1928) (holding that the previous
court had not erred in refusing to confirm appointment of the decedent’s son as an execu-
tor, the son having been found by the court to be responsible for the suppression of his
mother’s will).
40. See, e.g., Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1948) (decedent, when planning
to sign a will shortly before her death, was prevented from doing so by two relatives using
“physical force or . . . creating a disturbance”). Pope v. Garrett is cited in the reporter’s notes as
the basis for RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 illus.
11 (2003). See also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 351–52 (using Pope v. Garrett as
example for the functioning of constructive trusts as remedies in interference cases).
41. See, e.g., Brazil v. Silva, 185 P. 174 (Cal. 1919) (testator was deceived by beneficiary
into believing that the will that he intended to revoke had been destroyed by beneficiary).
Brazil v. Silva is cited in the reporter’s notes as the basis for RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 illus. 10 (2003); see also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra
note 11, at 351–53 (using Brazil v. Silva as an example for the functioning of constructive
trusts as remedies in interference cases).
42. This problem does not arise in the cases of will forgery and will suppression. Because
the testator is not under the influence of the interferor in these cases, there is no reason to
speculate what the testator’s mental state would have been if there had been no interference.
This is not to say, however, that these cases may not cause evidentiary problems. In the case
of a will forgery, it might not be possible to establish the authenticity of the purported will
with certainty. Similarly, in a case of will suppression, it might be impossible to establish the
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freedom of testation takes place posthumously,43 this testimony is
obviously not available. Of course, courts might instead rely on evi-
dence only in regards to past conduct of the testator and operate
with inferences, presumptions, and burden shifting. Although such
mechanisms might help when it comes to verifying the wrongful
interference as such,44 they are inevitably less reliable when it
comes to establishing the testator’s true intent, given that the latter
is entirely part of the testator’s inner world. This “worst evidence”
problem45 explains why remedying interference with freedom of te-
station is a serious challenge for any court or law reformer.
II. THE EXISTING REMEDIES—WHY THEY ARE NOT SATISFACTORY
WITH REGARD TO DETERRENCE
American law recognizes several remedies that promise relief for
interference with freedom of testation, some of them well estab-
lished (i.e. will contest and constructive trusts) and one of them
fairly recent (i.e. the tort action for interference with an inheri-
tance). The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that neither the
“old” remedies nor the “new” remedy are satisfactory when it comes
to deterrence of interference with freedom of testation. Contrary to
what some commentators suggest, even a legislative reform of these
remedies would not solve the problem of under-deterrence of inter-
ference with freedom of testation.
content of the suppressed document. In the latter cases, the severity of the evidentiary diffi-
culties depends of course on how the testator executed the will. In the case of an attested will,
the content of the suppressed will might also be established by the attesting witnesses. In the
case of holographic wills, by contrast, where attesting witnesses are not required, this might
often not be possible. Holographic wills are nowadays permitted in more than half of the
states. For an account of the different testamentary formalities in the United States, see
DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 30, at 228–85.
43. For a critique of the American model of post-mortem probate and an account of
rare legislative experiments with ante-mortem probate, see Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W.
Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131 (1990).
44. For an account of how inferences, presumptions, and burden shifting are used to
establish undue influence, see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 395. Nevertheless, estab-
lishing undue influence is by no means easy, given that it must often take place against the
background of complicated interpersonal relations that are difficult to grasp from the
outside. See id. at 62. Other forms of interference with freedom of testation will also be very
difficult to prove given that they will hardly ever be conducted openly.
45. This term goes back to John Langbein, who condemned the requirement that the
testator be dead before investigations regarding his capacity can take place as a “ ‘worst evi-
dence’ rule.” See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 Yale L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994) (reviewing
DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FOR-
TUNE (1993)); cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 365, 376 (using the term “‘worst
evidence’ problem” more generally for the problem of establishing the true intent of a de-
ceased person).
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A. Will Contests and Their Deficiencies in Terms of Deterrence
The classic remedy against interference with freedom of testation
is the will contest, a proceeding that is brought in order to have a
will either declared invalid or denied admission to probate.46 Typi-
cally, it can only be brought after the testator’s death and only by
persons with a financial interest in the contest.47 The grounds of
contest include, but are not limited to, most acts of interference
with freedom of testation. The Restatement (Third) of Property ex-
plicitly states that a will procured by undue influence, duress, or
fraud is invalid.48 In the comments, it is made clear that forgery is
also a ground for contest.49 Despite its seemingly broad area of ap-
plication, will contests are often criticized as providing an
insufficient remedy against interference with freedom of testation.50
As shall be demonstrated, this criticism holds true, particularly if
one analyzes will contests with regard to their suitability for deter-
ring potential interferors.
The first reason why will contests are sometimes alleged to be an
insufficient remedy are the special procedural difficulties that will
contestants face.51 For example, depending on the jurisdiction,
there are strict limits on standing and time limitations for bringing
a contest.52 Moreover, some probate courts require a higher stan-
dard of proof (i.e. clear and convincing evidence) for certain
allegations of interference with freedom of testation than is nor-
mally required in civil actions.53 These procedural hurdles are
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, 3 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 26.50 (2004); WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 27 (4th ed. 2010).
47. See, e.g., MCGOVERN, KURZ & ENGLISH, supra note 46, at 638–40.
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3
(2003).
49. Id. at § 8.3 cmt. o.
50. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 15, at 773–74; Klein, Fourth Circuit, supra note 13, at 260;
Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits, supra note 13, at 238–39; Steven K. Mignogna, On
The Brink of Tortious Interference with Inheritance, 16 PROB. & PROP. 45, 47–48 (2002); Orr, supra
note 15, at 764–75.
51. See, e.g., Martin L. Fried, The Disappointed Heir: Going Beyond the Probate Process to Rem-
edy Wrongdoing or Rectify Mistake, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357, 361–66 (2004); Klein,
Fourth Circuit, supra note 13, at 260–61; Jared S. Renfroe, Comment, Does Tennessee Need An-
other Tort? The Disappointed Heir in Tennessee and Tortious Interference with Expectancy of
Inheritance or Gift, 77 TENN. L. REV. 385, 397–98 (2010).
52. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-108(3), 3-412(3)(A) (2010) (twelve month limita-
tion period); see also MCGOVERN, KURZ & ENGLISH, supra note 46, at 636–38, 640–42.
53. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 51, at 366.
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substantial and might, at least to some extent, explain why will con-
tests only rarely occur.54 Of course, one could justify these hurdles
by reference to the fact that there seems to be a substantial risk of
spurious will contests because of both the elusiveness of the con-
cept of undue influence and the peculiarities of American civil
procedure.55 This does not alter the fact that, from an interferor’s
perspective, the “roadblocks”56 for will contestants are most wel-
come. They decrease the probability of a successful will contest
being brought and thus increase the chance that an interference
with freedom of testation will yield profit.
The second reason why will contests are often considered an in-
sufficient remedy does not merely relate to modifiable details of
their procedural design. Because will contests are merely a means
for invalidating a wrongfully procured will, they obviously cannot
offer relief in two of the typical cases of interference with freedom
of testation that have been identified above:57 the prevention of the
execution of a will (case five) and the prevention of the revocation
of a will (case six).58 In case five, as a result of the interference,
54. See e.g., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests–An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 607, 614 (1987) (presenting an empirical study according to which less than one
percent of wills offered for probate in Davidson County within a period of nine years were
contested). But see Langbein, supra note 45, at 2042 n.5 (1994) (noting that the amount of
capacity litigation in the United States is still “very serious”).
55. See e.g., Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 346 (stating that the openness of undue
influence suits to circumstantial evidence creates incentives for strike suits); Daniel B. Kelly,
Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1685–86 (2011) (stating that “[n]egative ex-
pected value suits are common in . . . probate courts” and noting that will contests may be
initiated only to extract a settlement); Langbein, supra note 45, at 2042–45 (arguing that,
inter alia, the availability of jury trial in probate matters and the American rule of costs invite
meritless will contests); Leopold & Beyer, supra note 43, at 134–36 (arguing that the post-
mortem probate system encourages spurious will contests); Scalise, supra note 30, at 99–100
(arguing that undue influence suits are so common in the United States because American
law creates incentives for suing outside of the merits of the litigation); Spivack, supra note 30,
at 286–90 (arguing that the continuing existence of the undue influence doctrine means that
heirs dissatisfied with a will can use the threat of a will contest to gain a settlement).
56. Fried, supra note 51, at 361.
57. See supra Part I.B.
58. It should be noted that a will contest is also not the right remedy for cases three
(wrongful procurement of a revocation of will) and four (suppression of a will). However, in
these cases, it is, at least in principle, possible to offer the original will for probate. Of course,
the revoked or suppressed will can only be admitted to probate if its due execution and
content can be proven, for example on the basis of existing copies, drafts, or recollection.
This will be very difficult in most cases, not least because there is a presumption that a lost
will has been destroyed by the testator with the intention to destroy it. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmts. a, j, k (1999); cf. Fried,
supra note 51, at 364–66 (describing the difficulties faced by proponents of a destroyed will);
Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 377–78 (discussing the question whether probate offers
adequate relief in case of will suppression by reference to In re Estate of Hatten, 880 So. 2d
1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
WINTER 2014] Protecting Freedom of Testation 433
there is no will that could be invalidated.59 In case six, the will
which the testator intended to revoke must nevertheless be admit-
ted to probate because the necessary revocatory act on the will has
not been performed.60 In both cases, even a legislative reform of
the will contest cannot alleviate the under-deterrence problem.
Finally, from a deterrence perspective, there is a third reason why
will contests are not a satisfactory remedy, even in cases where will
contests are clearly applicable.61 If faced only with the possibility of
a will contest, a potential interferor has, simply put, almost nothing
to lose from his misbehavior. Even if the wrongfully procured will is
determined to be invalid as a result of a will contest, the interferor
will end in a financial position that is not substantially worse than
the one he would have been in absent the wrongful interference.62
This is so because the interferor’s financial63 losses from a frus-
trated attempt of interference will usually only come from two
sources. First, if the interferor (unsuccessfully) tries to defend the
wrongfully purported will against contest, he will incur attorney’s
fees and other related costs. Given that, at least in most cases, he
will act in bad faith when defending the wrongfully procured will,
the interferor will most likely not be able to recover his costs from
the estate, irrespective of whether he acts as executor or as a mere
beneficiary.64 Second, the interferor will incur opportunity costs
59. See, e.g., Mignogna, supra note 50, at 48; Nita Ledford, Note, Intentional Interference
with Inheritance, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 325, 342 (1995); Linda S. Stinehart, Note,
Tortious Interference with Inheritance in Illinois, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181, 203–04 (1984).
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 illus.
10 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. g
(1999). In some cases, however, the harmless error rule might apply to render the revocation
effective. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 illus.
10 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 3.3 cmt.
c, 4.1 cmt. g (1999).
61. On the basis of what has been said in the previous paragraph, it is clear that will
contests can offer relief only in cases one (wrongful procurement of a will) and five (forgery
of a will).
62. Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, supra note 12, at 90; James A. Fassold, Tortious Inter-
ference with Expectancy of Inheritance: New Tort, New Traps, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 2000, at 26.
63. In addition to financial losses, there might of course also be reputational losses asso-
ciated with a probate court’s finding that the will is invalid as a result of a wrongful act by the
interferor. However, these costs will in most cases not be significant enough to exert substan-
tial deterrence.
64. See, e.g., In re Faust’s Estate, 96 P.2d 680 (Kan. 1939) (holding that court may refuse
to allow costs and attorney fees to be paid out of an estate when a will is denied probate and
the executor acted in bad faith); In re Winckler, 651 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71 (App. Div. 1996) (cita-
tion omitted) (holding that allowing the proponent of a will who has procured the execution
of the will by undue influence “to recover his attorney’s fees from the assets of the estate
would be a ‘perversion of justice’ because it would allow the proponent of the will to profit by
his own wrong”); Mitchell v. Smith, 779 S.W.2d 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
proponents who undertake to probate a will in good faith are entitled to have their costs paid
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when planning and carrying out the interference with freedom of
testation.65 In the case of a year-long campaign of undue influence,
for example, these costs will likely be significant, given that, as a
result of his interference attempt, the interferor will have substan-
tially less time to pursue other activities. In most cases, however,
opportunity costs will probably be negligible given that planning
and carrying out the interference is unlikely to be very time-
consuming.66
From the perspective of a potential wrongdoer who weighs the
probable gains from an interference with freedom of testation
against the probable costs,67 the previously mentioned costs will
probably not be substantial enough to exert a large deterrent effect.
This is so because the probability of a successful contest of a wrong-
fully purported will is significantly less than one hundred percent,
given the fact that interference with freedom of testation is not eas-
ily discovered and there are “roadblocks” for will contestants. For a
rational actor, the expected costs of an interference will corre-
spondingly be smaller, and interference with freedom of testation
will thus almost always produce an expected gain.68 To illustrate,
from the assets of the estate, but not proponents of a will procured through undue influ-
ence); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 843 (2011) (noting that a denial of probate on the ground that it was
procured by fraud or undue influence of the executor would indicate bad faith on side of the
executor and would prevent him from recovering his expenses from the estate); cf. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 3-720 (2010) (“If any personal representative or person nominated as per-
sonal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith whether successful
or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements
including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred.”).
65. Of course, these costs arise independently of whether a will contest is successfully
brought.
66. In particular, the opportunity costs of fraud, threat, duress, will forgery, and will
suppression will hardly be substantial. In addition, it should be noted that with regard to
these opportunity costs, the interferor has full discretion as to how much he wants to spend.
67. The idea that wrongdoers engage in a cost/benefits analysis before deciding to act is
one of the premises of the economic analysis of deterrence. Of course, “real wrongdoers” do
not always behave in a way that is consistent with the notion of homo economicus, as behavioral
economics have shown. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45–46 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Within the scope of the present Article, it is not possible to address
the abundant literature on how the insights from social sciences about people’s actual behav-
ior require a modification of standard deterrence theory. With regards to interference with
freedom of testation, it does not seem untenable, however, to take the idea of the rationally
calculating wrongdoer as a starting point. After all, as opposed to other wrongs committed
within the context of close personal relationships, interference with freedom of testation will
in most cases clearly be motivated by the concrete prospect of economic gain and not by
other motivations that are a priori incompatible with the idea of the calculating wrongdoer.
68. The significance of the probability of law enforcement for the issue of deterrence is
also one of the central ideas of the economic analysis of deterrence. According to orthodox
deterrence theory, a sanction that would deter optimally at an enforcement rate of one hun-
dred percent should be multiplied by the inverse probability of its imposition to account for
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think of a hypothetical legal system where a thief only risks having
to compensate the owner for the value of the stolen property if his
wrongful act is discovered and the owner successfully brings a claim
in court. Such a legal system would be unsatisfactory when it comes
to deterring potential thieves.69 Similarly, the threat of a will contest
alone will not deter a potential interferor.
B. Constructive Trusts and Their Deficiencies in Terms of Deterrence
The previous Section demonstrated that will contests cannot
serve as a remedy in some cases of interference with freedom of
testation.70 To close this remedial gap, courts have, for a considera-
ble time, made use of constructive trusts,71 an equitable remedy
aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of one person at the ex-
pense of another.72 As such, these trusts are part of the law of
restitution,73 i.e. the academically neglected74 part of American law
the fact that enforcement is in reality not one hundred percent. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 262 (8th ed. 2011); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 244 (2004); Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle
and its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2186 (1999); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and
the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 422–23 (1998); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998). Within the
context of the present Article, it is not possible to address the controversial question whether
the so-called “multiplier principle” is a sound basis for legislative decisions regarding the
sanctioning of wrongdoing. In any case, it does not seem unreasonable to continue the argu-
ment on the premise that law’s deterrent effect is in fact diminished (albeit to an unknown
extent) when the probability of enforcement is less than one.
69. For an authoritative treatment of this problem from the perspective of law and eco-
nomics, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124–27 (1972).
70. See supra text accompanying note 58.
71. See GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 20.2–.5 (1978); Goldberg &
Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 349–51.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b (2011)
(“[T]he term ‘constructive trust,’ used correctly to designate a remedy for unjust enrichment
. . . .”); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(2) (2d ed. 1993); PALMER, supra note 71, at
§ 1.3; Mark R. Siegel, Unduly Influenced Trust Revocations, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 241, 248–50 (2002).
73. See Lionel Smith, Legal Epistemology in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 899, 910–11 (2012) (simultaneously pointing out and criticizing
the fact that the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment is the only restatement in
which constructive trusts are treated). In the 1920s, the American Law Institute originally
planned to deal with the topic of constructive trusts within the Restatement of Trusts before
later deciding that it would better be treated together with the topic of quasi-restatements as
part of the Restatement of Restitution. See Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern
History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 299–302 (2005).
74. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 reporter’s note
a (2011) (“An incomparably more extensive literature on the theory of restitution and unjust
enrichment has been produced in recent decades by scholars outside the United States.”);
Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993, 994
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that, according to common orthodoxy, deals with liability based on
unjust enrichment.75 In an action for restitution, the remedy of the
constructive trust allows the court to direct that a specific piece of
property to which the defendant holds title be transferred to the
claimant in order to rectify unjustified enrichment.76 Because prop-
erty acquired through interference with an intended donative
transfer is considered an unjust enrichment of the recipient at the
expense of the intended beneficiary,77 constructive trust can offer
relief in cases of interference with freedom of testation.78 For sev-
eral reasons, however, it would be wrong to assume that the
constructive trust solves the problem of under-deterrence resulting
from the deficiencies of the will contest as a remedy.
To begin with, constructive trusts do not constitute a generally
available alternative to the will contest. Most jurisdictions ensure
that an action in restitution is not used to circumvent the rules of
procedure and limitation periods that apply in probate proceed-
ings.79 Consequently, a constructive trust may only be imposed
where relief cannot be obtained in the probate court, i.e. in those
cases where the execution or revocation of a will is prevented.80 In
(2008) (“Whereas in American legal discourse restitution sits at the backwaters of the aca-
demic and judicial consciousness, in recent years, English and Commonwealth courts have
expended considerable energy to articulate and develop this substantive area of law.”);
Chaim Saman, Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party, 28
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100 (2008) (“The past twenty-five years have witnessed a global
renaissance of restitution reflected in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of books and arti-
cles. . . . The United States remains a notable holdout to this global movement.”).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011) (“A per-
son who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.”);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) (“A person who has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.”); PALMER, supra note
71, at § 1.1. But see HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 11–36 (2004) (criti-
cizing the unjust enrichment reasoning).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b (2011).
For a famous articulation of the principle behind the constructive trust by Justice Cardozo,
see Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) (“A constructive
trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property
has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.”).
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. a (2011).
78. In addition, constructive trusts can also serve as a remedy in cases of wrongful inter-
ferences with inter vivos gifts. See id. at § 46(2). For the purpose of this Article, however, this
is irrelevant.
79. See id. at § 46 cmt. c; cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 351 (“[R]estitution by
way of constructive trust is a gap-filling complement . . . .”).
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmts. c, e, i
(2011); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 184 (1937) (“Where a disposition of
property by will or an intestacy is procured by fraud, duress or undue influence, the person
acquiring the property holds it upon a constructive trust, unless adequate relief can otherwise be
given in a probate court.”) (emphasis added). In addition to cases of wrongful prevention of the
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all other cases, the probate proceeding, with its previously de-
scribed problems in terms of deterrence, remains the only remedy
against interference with freedom of testation (apart from the con-
troversial interference with inheritance tort). Moreover, even in
cases where constructive trusts may be imposed, they do not pro-
vide sufficient deterrence against interference with freedom of
testation, insofar as they suffer from the same two deficiencies as
the will contest: problems regarding the burden of proof and the
level of sanctioning.
The burden of proving a constructive trust lies with the party
seeking to establish it.81 If the consequence of establishing a con-
structive trust would be to overturn a formal testamentary
disposition, courts may impose a higher standard of proof than in
ordinary actions for restitution and require the standard applicable
in comparable probate litigation, such as “clear and convincing evi-
dence.”82 This in itself can cause substantial difficulties for potential
plaintiffs.83 What is more problematic than the standard of proof,
however, is the scope of issues that have to be established. For a
constructive trust to be imposed, the claimant has to establish that
“the defendant (i) has been unjustly enriched (ii) by acquiring le-
gal title to a specifically identifiable property (iii) at the expense of
the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights.”84 When it
comes to interference with freedom of testation, this means that,
for relief by way of constructive trust, unlike the case of will con-
tests, it is insufficient to establish interference with the testator’s
freedom of testation. The claimant must establish that, but for the
wrongful interference, the claimant would have been the recipient
execution or revocation of a will where probate can never offer relief, constructive trusts are
sometimes also imposed in other cases of interference with freedom of testation where relief
in probate is simply very difficult to attain, namely the cases of wrongful procurement of
revocation of a will and will suppression. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. d (2011); PALMER, supra note 71, at § 20.5. For an explanation why in
the latter cases relief in probate is not a priori impossible, see supra note 58.
81. See, e.g., U.S. v. Currency $11,331, 482 F. Supp. 2d 873, 882 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Lucas
v. Grant, 962 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 200 (2010).
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. c (2011).
83. This is not to say that applying the same standard of proof in restitution actions as in
probate litigation does not make sense when their effects would be virtually the same. Nor
does it imply that the requirement of clear and convincing evidence in inheritance cases is an
inadequate response to the “worst evidence” problem. However, irrespective of whether this
particular standard of choice reflects a good policy judgment, one cannot escape the fact
that, as a result of a stricter standard of proof, not only bogus claims but also well-founded
actions are less likely to succeed. From the perspective of the interferor, this makes an action
in restitution much less worrisome.
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. a (2011).
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of specific assets of the decedent.85 Obviously, the latter issue can
cause even more difficulties than the first. After all, in cases where
the decedent is under the controlling influence of another party,
one must establish how the decedent would have exercised his free-
dom of testation if there had been no interference. Because of the
“worst evidence problem” that has been described above,86 this will
often prove impossible. The only fact that can be proven is that the
testator was prevented from freely exercising his autonomy—but
not how he intended to exercise it. This problem is inherent in the
concept of constructive trust, and it is the first of two reasons why
constructive trusts are insufficient as a means of deterring interfer-
ence with freedom of testation.
The second problem of constructive trusts stems from a lack of
deterrence because of the degree of sanctioning. As indicated, con-
structive trusts form part of the law of restitution and, as such, are
directed at preventing unjust enrichment, not at imposing penal-
ties.87 Punitive damages are consequently not available by way of
constructive trusts.88 This in itself would not lead to an under-deter-
rence problem if the unjust enrichment of the interferor would be
rectified in most cases.89 After all, if an interferor were almost al-
ways barred from the profits of his wrongdoing, there would be
virtually no incentive for him to act given that he would also have to
85. See, e.g., Ransdel v. Moore 53 N.E. 767, 771 (Ind. 1899) (“The rule established by the
authorities is that when an heir or devisee in a will prevents the testator from providing for
one for whom he would have provided but for the interference of the heir or devisee, such heir
or devisee will be deemed a trustee, by operation of law, of the property, real or personal,
received by him from the testator’s estate, to the amount or extent that the defrauded party
would have received had not the intention of the deceased been interfered with.” (emphasis
added)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. e, illus. 10
(2011) (presenting an example of a wrongful interference with an intended donative transfer
and stating that a constructive trust can be imposed if the intended beneficiary can prove
that, “but for the wrongful interference,” he would have been designated as beneficiary (em-
phasis added)).
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., U.S. v. Snepp 595 F.2d 926, 937 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[A] constructive trust
depends on the concept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment.”); In
re Estate of Corriea 719 A.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. 1998) (“The remedy of disgorgement, much
like that of a constructive trust, is meant ‘to provide just compensation for the wrong, not to
impose a penalty.’” (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399
(1940))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. k (2011)
(“The rationale of punitive or exemplary damages is independent of the law of unjust enrich-
ment. The rules that govern such damages are part of the tort law of a given jurisdiction,
often fixed by statute, outside the scope of this Restatement.”).
88. See, e.g., Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits, supra note 13, at 239–40; cf. Goldberg
& Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 372 (noting that there are “almost certainly no punitive damages”
in restitution actions with constructive trusts).
89. In this respect, it seems noteworthy that disgorgement of profits is explicitly advo-
cated by some scholars of deterrence theory as the preferable sanctioning measure for
activities that are always socially undesirable. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties
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bear the opportunity costs of his interference90 and the litigation
costs associated with being a defendant in an action for restitution.
However, not unlike the case of the will contest, the likelihood of a
constructive trust being imposed to rectify an interference with
freedom of testation is much less than one hundred percent, even
in cases where this remedy would in principle be available.
The previously described issues of burden of proof and the gen-
eral difficulties of detecting interference with freedom of testation
make a successful action in restitution unlikely. Thus, from the per-
spective of a rational wrongdoer,91 the financial risks associated with
a constructive trust—the chance of losing one’s profits and incur-
ring litigation costs—are correspondingly smaller.92 Hence, an
interference with freedom of testation will in most cases produce an
expected gain, even where constructive trusts are theoretically avail-
able as a remedy.
In conclusion, the preceding analysis of the “traditional” reme-
dies against interference with freedom of testation suggests that will
contest and constructive trust, even together, do not sufficiently de-
ter potential interferors. In addition, a legislative reform of these
remedies, as recommended by some commentators, would help
only minimally to alleviate this situation. The problem that will con-
tests are simply unsuitable for many cases of interference with
freedom of testation is not simply a matter of procedural design
that could be changed. The same holds true for the problem that
constructive trusts require the establishment of certain facts that
might often not be accessible, irrespective of the standard of proof
that is applied.
C. Tort Actions and Their Deficiencies in Terms of Deterrence
The tort cause of action for wrongful interference with expec-
tancy of inheritance is still a comparatively recent phenomenon
and is not yet recognized in all jurisdictions,93 even though it has
found recognition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.94 It gives a
and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 182–83 (2005); Keith N. Hylton,
Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 575, 581–82 (2008).
90. See supra text accompanying note 65.
91. For a brief discussion of the notion of the rational wrongdoer, see supra note 67.
92. For a discussion of the importance of enforcement probability for deterrence, see
supra note 68.
93. See sources cited supra note 13.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979). For an overview of the develop-
ments that have led to a recognition in the restatement and a critique of this process, see
Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 357–61.
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disappointed heir the opportunity to recover damages if, as a result
of another person’s interference with the decedent’s freedom of
testation, the disappointed heir was prevented from receiving an
inheritance.95 Thus, from a conceptual point of view, the marked
difference between this tort action and the previously described ac-
tion in restitution is as follows: whereas a constructive trust seeks to
rectify an unjust enrichment of the defendant, this action in tort
aims to compensate the plaintiff’s loss.96 Within the context of in-
terference with freedom of testation, however, this conceptual
difference hardly gives rise to practical consequences.97 In most
cases of interference with freedom of testation, the disappointed
heir’s loss will match the interferor’s gain.98 Nevertheless, there are
(in many jurisdictions) differences between an action in tort and an
action for constructive trust that are supposed to be of great rele-
vance to disappointed heirs. Most notable are the availability of a
jury trial,99 the chance of being awarded punitive damages,100 and
the application of the ordinary civil preponderance of the evidence
standard101 as opposed to the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard used in probate. It is mainly for these reasons that legal
practitioners consider the new tort action for wrongful interference
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979).
96. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. b
(2011) (explaining the difference between restitution and an action for damages); DOBBS,
supra note 72, at § 3.1 (explaining the remedial differences between restitution and
damages).
97. This is not to say that the conceptual difference between, on the one hand, a focus
on the defendant’s unjust enrichment and, on the other hand, a focus on the plaintiff’s loss
never yields practical consequences. As a result of this conceptual difference, for example, a
tort action is only available against the wrongdoer himself whereas constructive trusts can
also be imposed on otherwise innocent third parties as long as they are unjustly enriched. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. a (2011). This is of
great relevance in cases where the interferor does not act for his own benefit, but for the
benefit of a third party. See supra note 32.
98. A disparity between the interferor’s gain and the disappointed heir’s loss exists, how-
ever, in case of consequential losses and non-pecuniary losses in the form of emotional
distress. In many jurisdictions, such damages are available in a tort action for interference
with inheritance. See, e.g., York Ins. Grp. of Me. v. Lambert 740 A.2d 984, 986 (Me. 1999)
(holding that, even though the claim did not include allegations of emotional distress, “the
general allegations of the interference with an expectancy of inheritance claim carry the
possibility of an award for emotional distress.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 774B
cmt. e, 774A(1)(c) (1979); Ledford, supra note 59, at 339–40. Given the limited number of
cases in which such damages are awarded, this disparity does not seem to be of substantial
importance in the present context.
99. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 337; Klein, Fourth Circuit, supra note 13, at
265.
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 774B cmt. e, 774 cmt. a (1979); Fassold,
supra note 62, at 28; Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, supra note 12, at 88.
101. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 376 n.290; Klein, Pacific States, supra note 13,
at 230–31.
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with expectancy of inheritance an attractive option,102 and why, as
indicated above, some authors argue that recognizing this tort
would help to close the deterrence gap left by the traditional reme-
dies.103 It is doubtful, however, that the new tort action has
substantial advantages over the traditional remedies against inter-
ference with freedom of testation when it comes to deterring this
wrongful behavior.
The primary reason that will contests and constructive trusts have
turned out to be dissatisfactory from a deterrence perspective con-
cerns the hurdles faced by disappointed heirs with regard to issues
of proof.104 In this respect, the new tort action fails to bring about
significant improvement. This might sound counterintuitive given
the fact that, at least in some jurisdictions, courts apply a lower stan-
dard of proof in tort actions for interference with inheritance than
in will contests or actions in restitution.105 As the above analysis of
constructive trust demonstrates, however, sometimes it is not so
much the applicable standard of proof that creates problems for
disappointed heirs but rather the scope of issues that have to be
proven for the remedy to apply.106 This also holds true with regard
to the tort action for interference with an expectancy of
inheritance.
The elements of the interference tort that the plaintiff must es-
tablish are commonly held to be:107 (1) the existence of an
expectancy;108 (2) intentional interference with that expectancy;
102. See, e.g., Dennis D. Reaves, Tortious Interference with an Expected Gift or Inheritance, 47 J.
MO. B. 563, 567 (1991) (“[A] tort action for interference with an expected gift, with its more
lucrative damage options, could be an appropriate and attractive remedy.”); Curtis E. Shirley,
Tortious Interference with an Expectancy, RES GESTAE, Oct. 1997, at 16, 20–21 (“The tort of inten-
tional interference with an expectancy . . . is a powerful weapon in comparison to the usual
alternatives available to the probate practitioner. Plaintiff attorneys should become familiar
with the tort in the circumstances where the normal probate alternatives may not provide
adequate relief.”).
103. See sources cited supra note 15.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 81–86.
105. See sources cited supra note 101.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
107. See, e.g., Beckwith v. Dahl, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1050 (Ct. App. 2012); In re Estate
of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill., 2009); Morrill v. Morrill, 712 A.2d 1039, 1041–42 (Me.
1998); Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ohio 1993); Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d
837, 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Klein, Pacific States, supra note 13, at 214; see also Sonja A.
Soehnel, Annotation, Liability in Damages for Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift, 22
A.L.R. 4TH 1229 (1983).
108. The question of how the existence of an expectancy of inheritance can be estab-
lished has often occupied the courts, and yet there seems to be no clear consensus on what is
necessary. Some courts and commentators have suggested that the mere existence of a par-
ent-child relationship is sufficient to establish an expectancy. See, e.g., Morrill v. Morrill, 679
A.2d 519, 521 (Me. 1996); Fassold, supra note 62, at 27. Others have rejected the idea that an
expectancy can be established merely by status. See, e.g., Morrill, 712 A.2d at 1041–42; Holt v.
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(3) independently tortious conduct (such as undue influence,
fraud, or duress);109 (4) reasonable certainty that, but for the tor-
tious interference, the plaintiff would have received the expectancy;
and (5) damages. Thus, not unlike the case of the constructive
trust, it does not suffice to prove that there has been a wrongful
interference with freedom of testation. From the first and fourth
element of the tort, it follows that the plaintiff must also prove that,
had there been no such interference, he would have received a
larger inheritance. Hence, the plaintiff must establish that the dece-
dent would have left something to the plaintiff absent the
interference.110 The difficulties associated with the latter issue have
already been described above. Given the “worst evidence problem”
and given the fact that the decedent’s true intent is entirely part of
his inner world, there cannot be certainty about how he would have
exercised his freedom of testation absent the interference.111
In jurisdictions where the interference tort is recognized, courts
are of course aware of the previously described difficulties. Hence,
most of them require only “reasonable certainty” that, but for the
interference, the disappointed heir would have realized his expec-
tancy.112 In many cases of interference with freedom of testation,
however, this cannot solve the difficulties of proof.113 What if, for
example, the plaintiff can establish that the interferor burned the
testator’s will, but can only speculate about its content? What if it
can be proven that the testator was prevented from executing a will,
but not whom he was planning to designate as heir? In cases like
these, where it is simply impossible to come to any conclusion about
the testator’s true intent, lowering the standard of proof does not
Holt 61 S.E.2d 448, 452 (N.C. 1950); see also Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits, supra note
13, at 258–60. When an expectancy cannot be established by reference to status, courts have
differed as to what kind of evidence the plaintiff must put forward, in particular whether
written evidence of the decedent’s intent is necessary. See Fassold, supra note 62, at 27; Led-
ford, supra note 59, at 327–34.
109. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B cmt. c (1979). As Professors
Goldberg and Sitkoff point out, the characterization by courts and the restatement of undue
influence and duress as “independently tortious” is actually inconsistent with tort doctrine.
See Goldberg & Siktoff, supra note 11, at 393.
110. But see Fassold, supra note 62, at 27 (arguing that proof of the testator’s true intent is
not necessary in a tort action for interference with inheritance); Shirley, supra note 102, at 18
(claiming that only proof of the defendant’s intent is necessary in a tort action for interfer-
ence with inheritance). These statements are, however, incompatible with the elements of
the interference tort as established by the courts. See Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, supra
note 12, at 88 n.27.
111. See supra text accompanying note 42.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B cmt. d (1979); Soehnel, supra note 107.
113. See Renfroe, supra note 51, at 398 (noting that “evidentiary difficulties of proving
what the testator would have done” might cause problems for potential claimants under the
interference tort).
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help plaintiffs with valid causes of action. Even worse, such a step
might also increase the risk of spurious claims. Thus, there is no
reason to consider the interference with inheritance tort as an ad-
vantageous solution to the “worst evidence problem” in comparison
with will contests and constructive trusts.
The second reason that will contests and constructive trusts have
proven imperfect with regard to deterrence relates to the degree of
sanctioning that may result. In this respect, the tort action admit-
tedly has advantages insofar as it allows courts to award punitive
damages. Even ardent critics of the interference tort concede that,
with regard to deterrence, the imposition of over-compensatory
damages may make sense in cases of interference with freedom of
testation.114 The reasons for this have been outlined above: given
the difficulties of detecting interference with freedom of testation,
and given the procedural problems faced by potential plaintiffs, it is
quite unlikely from the point of view of an interferor that his
wrongdoing will be sanctioned at all. To account for this circum-
stance, sanctions for the interference should correspondingly be
increased in order to ensure that the wrongful deed does not yield
an expected gain in the eyes of the potential interferor calculating
the prospective costs and benefits of his action.115
Nevertheless, it seems that punitive damages are awarded only
rarely in cases of interference with freedom of testation.116 One rea-
son for this is that, in most jurisdictions, the tort action for
interference with inheritance may only be pursued where adequate
relief in probate proceedings is not available. For determining the
adequacy of relief in probate proceedings, it is irrelevant that puni-
tive damages are available in tort.117 Even when the tort action can
be pursued, as long as punitive damages are not awarded more
often, potential interferors do not have reason to be significantly
114. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 391 (“We do not deny that deterrence and
punishment objectives might point toward awarding punitive damages for wrongful interfer-
ence with inheritance.”).
115. Cf. sources cited supra note 68.
116. Cf., e.g., Dewitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 220 n.11 (Fla. 1981) (“[W]e can find no case
authority allowing punitive damages in this type of action.”); Reaves, supra note 102, at 565
(“[M]ost jurisdictions have yet to decide whether punitive damages would be allowed for
tortious interference in this noncommercial area.”).
117. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 44 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Ark. 2001); Minton v. Sackett, 671
N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 936 A.2d 1015, 2022 n.7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007);
Wilson v. Fritschy, 2002-NMCA-105, ¶ 32, 55 P.3d 997, 1005; Roll v. Edwards, 805 N.E.2d 162,
169 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). With regard to questions other than punitive damages, courts
seem much more willing to conclude that probate offers inadequate relief and to allow for
actions in tort. For a critical account of the application of the “adequacy-of-probate rule” by
courts, see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 377–79.
444 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
more concerned about the interference tort than about construc-
tive trusts. After all, in most cases, a judgment for compensatory
damages will not be substantially different from a judgment for res-
titution of the interferor’s gain by way of constructive trust. Even if
court practice were to change and punitive damages were imposed
more frequently—a development that might be undesirable for
reasons unrelated to the deterrence issue118—the problem of
under-deterrence of interference with freedom with testation would
probably not disappear. Given the difficulties of proving the testa-
tor’s true intent posthumously, it appears that the likelihood of a
successful action in tort is so small in many cases of interference
with freedom of testation that the legal system’s imperfect enforce-
ment could only be counterbalanced by punitive damages totally
disproportionate to the individual wrongdoing—a step that courts
obviously cannot take.119
D. Why Criminal Law Does Not Solve the Problem of Under-Deterrence
Any analysis of whether a certain type of unsocial behavior is ef-
fectively deterred would be incomplete without also devoting some
attention to criminal law. In regards to interference with freedom
of testation, criminal law does not close the deterrence gap left by
the imperfection of civil remedies. This is so for reasons related
both to substantive criminal law and to criminal law enforcement.
In regards to the first aspect, deterrence deficits arise from the
fact that not all forms of interference with freedom of testation can
actually be prosecuted under criminal law. Interference with free-
dom of testation as such does not constitute a crime. Although
some forms of misbehavior that amount to interference with free-
dom of testation do in fact constitute criminal offenses (e.g. the
forgery of a will and the subsequent offering of the forged will for
probate),120 other particularly relevant forms of interference, such
as undue influence or duress, do not necessarily constitute crimes.
118. Cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 391 n. 376 (objecting to the idea of recog-
nizing the interference tort for the purpose of making punitive damages available on the
ground that “tort law is not criminal law on par with criminal or regulatory law”).
119. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (“[C]ourts
must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the
amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.”).
120. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 470(c) (West 2010) (“Every person who, with the intent
to defraud, alters, corrupts, or falsifies any record of any will . . . is guilty of forgery.”); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 115(a) (West 1999) (“Every person who knowingly procures or offers any . . .
forged instrument to be filed . . . in any public office within this state, which instrument, if
genuine, might be filed . . . under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a
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Second, even where an act of interference with freedom of testa-
tion constitutes a criminal offense, the probability of enforcement
will in most cases not be high enough to exert sufficient deterrence.
Not only are the resources for criminal law enforcement limited,
but public authorities will also often lack the information to prose-
cute interferences, given that acts of interference with freedom of
testation typically take place within the context of private relation-
ships.121 Since disappointed heirs will usually not receive a reward
in return for reporting information about potential interferences to
the authorities, their incentive to do so will often be imperfect.
In addition, interferors will benefit from the fact that the stan-
dard of evidence required for a criminal conviction (beyond
reasonable doubt) is even higher than the standard applied in
many probate proceedings (clear and convincing evidence).122 This
decreases the probability of a criminal sanction for interference
with freedom of testation even further. Hence, the institutions of
criminal law will hardly deter potential wrongdoers from interfer-
ing with a testator’s freedom of testation.
III. THE NEW PROPOSAL FOR A SOLUTION TO THE
UNDER-DETERRENCE PROBLEM
The previous Part demonstrated that the existing remedies
against interference with freedom of testation—will contests, con-
structive trusts, and tort law—are unsatisfactory when it comes to
felony.”); id. at § 132 (“Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation
whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book,
paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been
forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.”); id. at § 134 (“Every person
guilty of preparing any false or ante-dated book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or
other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent
or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry whatever,
authorized by law, is guilty of felony.”); see also People v. Horowitz, 161 P.2d 833 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1945) (upholding a conviction of four distinct felonies—forgery of a will, Cal. Penal
Code § 470; causing a forged will to be filed, Cal. Penal Code § 115; offering a forged will in
evidence, Cal. Penal Code §132; preparing a false and antedated will, Cal. Penal Code
§ 134—in a case where the accused had prepared the contents of a purported will on a blank
piece of paper containing only the testatrix’s signature, subsequently offered the purported
will for probate, and presented it as evidence in defending a will contest).
121. The informational advantage of private actors over public actors is often mentioned
as one of the major arguments in favor of law enforcement via private parties. For such an
argument in a different context, see Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4–5
(2002) (“No matter how talented or dedicated our public law enforcement personnel may be
nor how many resources our society commits to regulatory efforts, a public regulatory system
will always lack the one resource that is indispensable to effective detection and deterrence of
complex economic wrongdoing: inside information.”).
122. Cf. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1482 (2006).
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deterring potential wrongdoers. In order to diminish this problem
of under-deterrence, this Part proposes a statutory solution that is
modeled after the so-called slayer statutes, which deal with the kill-
ing of a decedent by a prospective heir. To that end, Section A first
gives a brief overview of the historic origin and function of these
slayer statutes and demonstrates how they could serve as a blueprint
for a statutory remedy against inference with freedom of testation.
Section B then demonstrates how such a solution would help to
remedy the problem of under-deterrence. Following that, Section C
presents additional arguments in favor of the proposed solution
before trying to anticipate, in Section D, the possible criticism and
defending the proposed solution against it.
A. Slayer Statutes as a Model for Sanctioning Interference
with Freedom of Testation
Slayer statutes are the codification of an older, but originally not
universally recognized,123 common law maxim, the slayer rule, ac-
cording to which a person who wrongfully and intentionally kills
another person shall be denied any right to benefit from the
wrong.124 The 1889 New York Court of Appeals decision Riggs v.
Palmer125 is regarded as the most famous articulation of this princi-
ple.126 In that case, the defendant, a sixteen-year-old with the first
name Elmer, poisoned his grandfather after the latter had voiced
the intention of revoking some provisions in his will that were
123. See, e.g., Owens v. Owens 6 S.E. 794 (N.C. 1888) (refusing to bar a wife who had been
an accessory to the murder of her husband from her right of dower). For an account of the
reaction of the North Carolina legislature, see Linda J. Maki & Alan M. Kaplan, Elmer’s Case
Revisited: The Problem of The Murdering Heir, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 905, 930–31 (1980). For further
references to courts unwilling to apply the slayer rule, see John W. Wade, Acquisition of Prop-
erty by Willfully Killing Another—A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV L. REV. 715, 717 n.10 (1936). For
a detailed account of the history of slayer rules in the common law, see Alison Reppy, The
Slayer’s Bounty—History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 229 (1942);
Carla Spivack, Killers Shouldn’t Inherit From Their Victims—Or Should They?, GA. L. REV. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 6–16).
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt.
a, reporter’s note 1 (2003).
125. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
126. See, e.g., Robert F. Hennessy, Note, Property—The Limits of Equity: Forfeiture, Double
Jeopardy, and the Massachusetts “Slayer Statute”, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 166 (2009); Tara L.
Pehush, Comment, Maryland is Dying for a Slayer Statute: The Ineffectiveness of the Common Law
Slayer Rule in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 271, 276 (2005). But see Karen J. Sneddon, Should
Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the Extended Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76 UMKC
L. REV. 101, 107 (2007) (pointing out that Riggs was not the first case to articulate the slayer
rule in a modern fashion).
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favorable to the defendant.127 Two of the decedent’s children then
brought an action for the purpose of having the will provisions in
the defendant’s favor annulled.128 A majority on the bench openly
acknowledged that, if literally construed, the New York statutes reg-
ulating the making, proof, and effect of wills did not provide for
such an annulment.129 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the provi-
sions in Elmer’s favor should be declared ineffective because
“public policy” dictated that “[n]o one [should] be permitted to
profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to
found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by
his own crime.”130
Over the course of the twentieth century, Riggs v. Palmer (or “El-
mer’s case,” as it is sometimes referred to) gained some notoriety in
jurisprudential debates about the legally binding character of ab-
stract principles.131 With regard to the “murdering heir problem,”
however, this debate became less practically significant over time
because many state legislatures enacted slayer statutes.132 By codify-
ing the slayer rule, wind was taken out of the sails of those
complaining after Riggs about unwarranted judicial legislation.133
There is considerable variation among the states concerning the
language and content of these codifications, particularly in respect
to the types of killings and the types of benefits covered by the bar
from inheritance.134 However, concerning the latter question, there
is significant consensus that a slayer should be denied both statu-
tory benefits with regard to the decedent’s estate, such as an
127. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.
128. Id. at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 189 (majority opinion); see also id. at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 190 (majority opinion).
131. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23–24, 29–31
(1967) (using Riggs as an example for the idealist thesis of the binding character of princi-
ples). For replies to Dworkin, see Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1909, 1935–40 (2004) (criticizing Dworkin’s use of Riggs from a formalist perspective
because of its “potential unrepresentativeness”); Charles Silver, Elmer’s Case: A Legal Positivist
Replies to Dworkin, 6 LAW & PHIL. 381 (1987).
132. See Sneddon, supra note 126, at 109; see also Anne-Marie Rhodes, Consequences of Heirs’
Misconduct: Moving From Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975, 979 & n.20 (2007)
(reporting that as of 2007, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have slayer stat-
utes); Spivack, supra note 123, at 10 (reporting that, as of 2012, forty-four states have slayer
statutes, whereas the remaining states use common-law slayer rules).
133. Such criticism was already raised by Justice Gray in his dissenting opinion in Riggs. 22
N.E. at 191–93 (Gray, J., dissenting). For an overview of the debate at that time, see also
Hennessy, supra note 126, at 169–70; Wade, supra note 123, at 717–18.
134. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L.
Rev. 489, 496–99, 507–08 (1986); Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1089–94 (1970).
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intestacy share, and, if applicable, any benefits under the dece-
dent’s donative documents, for example a will.135
A slayer rule is also included in both the Restatements of Prop-
erty and of Restitution.136 In each codification, the slayer rule
immediately follows or precedes the rules on wrongful interference
with freedom of testation in the form of fraud, duress, and undue
influence.137 This close proximity is by no means coincidental. After
all, homicide motivated by the prospect of inheritance can be classi-
fied as another form of interference with freedom of testation138
given that it deprives the killed person of the chance of changing
his existing estate plan.139 Against this background, it is an obvious
move to use the forfeiture principle of the slayer statutes as a means
for addressing interference with freedom of testation in general.
Surprisingly, however, such a proposal has not yet been voiced in
the on-going debate about how to remedy interference with free-
dom of testation. The following Section shall sketch out what form
such a disinheritance statute for interference with freedom of testa-
tion might assume.
135. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-803(b), (c) (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4, reporter’s note 1 (2003) (listing the slayer
statutes that are based on the UPC provisions); Spivack, supra note 123, at 10–11 (describing
the typical content of a slayer statute).
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 (2011); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 (2003).
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT Part II (“Liability
In Restitution”), Chapter 5 (“Restitution For Wrongs”), Topic 2 (“Diversion Of Property
Rights At Death”) (2011) (comprising only § 45 (“Homicide: the Slayer Rule”) and § 46
(“Wrongful Interference With Donative Transfer”)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
& OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS Division III (“Protective Doctrines”), Chapter 8 (“Invalidity
Due To The Donor’s Incapacity Or Another’s Wrongdoing”), Part B (“Protection Against
Wrongdoing”) (2003) (comprising only § 8.3 (“Undue Influence, Duress, Or Fraud”) and
§ 8.4 (“Homicide–the Slayer Rule”)).
138. This would make the killing of the decedent the seventh case in the above-outlined
list of standard cases of interference with freedom of testation. See supra Part I.B.; cf. Zimmer-
mann, supra note 31, at 299 (having started with a list of five standard cases of interference
with freedom of testation, Zimmermann includes the killing of the decedent as the sixth).
139. See Fellows, supra note 134, at 493 (noting that “slayers motivated by greed . . . poten-
tially interrupt the normal disposition of property” because, inter alia, “the killings may deny
the victims the opportunity to change their existing estate plans”); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. a (“In a few cases outside these categories,
comparable misconduct produces comparable results. Interference by homicide, while liter-
ally within the terms of the present section, receives separate treatment in § 45.”).
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B. Possible Content and Application of a Disinheritance Statute for
Interference with Freedom of Testation
A legislator contemplating the enactment of a statutory bar from
inheritance in order to counteract interference with freedom of tes-
tation would primarily have to answer the following questions: (1)
what kind of wrongful behavior should lead to forfeiture; (2) what
kind of benefits should be forfeited; (3) who should take the for-
feited property instead of the wrongdoer; and (4) how and by
whom should the conditions for the forfeiture be proven? Given
that all of these questions may give rise to complex considerations,
this Article does not put forward an elaborate legislative proposal.
For the purpose of enhancing the debate on remedies against inter-
ference with freedom of testation, it seems sufficient to give a
general account of the possible content and application of a disin-
heritance statute for interference with freedom of testation.
In regards to the first question for a legislator contemplating
such a disinheritance statute—what form of behavior should lead to
forfeiture—there seems to be no reason to draw distinctions be-
tween the different types of interference with freedom of testation.
Hence, fraud, duress, undue influence, will forgery, and will sup-
pression should all trigger the bar from inheritance.
For the second question—the scope of forfeiture—slayer statutes
suggest that a wrongdoer should in any case be barred from both
testate and intestate succession. It seems that this would also be an
acceptable starting point for a rule on interference with freedom of
testation. In addition, a legislator has to consider whether other
statutory benefits arising at the decedent’s death140 and benefits
conferred by donative instruments other than wills141 should also be
included in a forfeiture rule.
With regard to the third question—who should take the assets
that would otherwise have gone to the interferor—slayer statutes
140. Such statutory benefits can, inter alia, arise in form of an elective share, omitted
spouse’s or child’s share, homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance. In
the case of most slayer statutes, the wrongdoer is denied the latter benefits as well, in addi-
tion to the statutory benefits following from intestacy rules. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
803(b) (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4
cmt. j (2003).
141. Such instruments include revocable trusts, retirement assets, and life insurance poli-
cies. Most slayer statutes cover them as well. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-803(c), 1-
201(18) (1969) (amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICH-
MENT § 45 cmts. e, f (2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. k (2003). Whether a bar from inheritance for interference with free-
dom of testation in general should be given an equally broad scope depends, again, on
whether one should focus exclusively on deterrence or also on other aspects, such as testa-
tor’s intent.
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also offer a workable solution. Most of them distribute property that
the wrongdoer is barred from taking as if the latter had prede-
ceased the decedent or disclaimed his interest.142 Enacting such a
specific rule with regard to the distribution of the victim’s estate
seems advantageous over relying primarily on principles of equity143
given that only a clear-cut rule can be effectively applied within the
probate proceeding. Sometimes, efficiency and legal certainty
might of course come at the price of individual justice. If the estate
is distributed as if the interferor predeceased the decedent, persons
might benefit that the decedent did not intend to designate as ben-
eficiaries. In such cases, however, equity could still be realized in a
subsequent action for restitution.144
Finally, for the actual application of such a disinheritance rule, it
follows from the foregoing that anyone who would benefit if the
estate were distributed as if the interferor had disclaimed his inter-
est should be able to invoke the interferor’s bar from inheritance in
a probate proceeding. Not unlike a slayer statute or other measures
against interference with freedom of testation, the burden should
142. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-803(b), (e), 2-1106(b)(3)(B) (2010); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 reporter’s note d (2011);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. j, k. It is
subject to debate, however, whether the approach that treats the wrongdoer as predeceased
should also be pursued in cases where it would allow the wrongdoer’s children to claim parts
of the estate by means of representation. Some jurisdictions have rejected this consequence
and limited the eligibility of the wrongdoer’s relatives to claim interests in the estate as a
result of the wrongdoing. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICH-
MENT § 45 cmt. d (2011); 26.B. C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 66 (2011); Sneddon, supra note
126, at 113–21. The latter approach might also be preferable in a case of a bar from inheri-
tance for interference with freedom of testation in general given that, otherwise, interferors
would often profit indirectly from their wrongdoing.
143. The latter approach is taken by the Restatement of Restitution. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45(3) (2011) (“Property the slayer is
barred from taking is distributed as directed by statute or (in the absence of statutory direc-
tion) to the person with the paramount equitable claim.”).
144. The need for an availability of such an equitable action can be demonstrated by the
following example. Father A plans to disinherit his sons B and C and intends to designate the
unrelated D as beneficiary of his estate. If B wrongfully prevented A from doing so, B would
be disqualified from inheritance under the proposed disinheritance statute. Under intestate
law, A’s estate would consequently be distributed as if B disclaimed his interest. Thus, the
estate would go to C even though A was planning to disinherit him as well. In effect, C would
thus gain a windfall profit as a result of B’s wrongful interference. In order to allow for the
realization of A’s true intent, D should consequently be able to bring an action for restitution
against C subsequent to the distribution of the estate. Such an action would of course face
the same procedural and evidentiary hurdles as an action for restitution against B. After all,
the very idea behind the proposed disinheritance statute is that D will often not be able to
prove that A was intending to designate him as beneficiary, and that thus the existence of the
disinheritance statute is needed to ensure that B faces a sanction for his wrongdoing. There
is no reason, however, why B’s bar from inheritance should preclude a subsequent equitable
action by D against C.
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be on the party invoking the remedy to prove the requirements of
its application. For the bar from inheritance to apply, the party ap-
pealing to it should have to establish that the purported heir has
interfered with the decedent’s freedom of testation. In regards to
the standard of proof, the internal coherence of succession law re-
quires the application of the same heightened standard of proof as
in the case of will contests or constructive trusts (i.e. clear and con-
vincing evidence) where the effect of the rule would be to overturn
a formal testamentary provision.145 From a perspective of deter-
rence, this might be imperfect. However, as will be demonstrated in
the following Section, the major advantage in terms of deterrence
of a disinheritance statute of the kind previously described over ex-
isting remedies against interference with freedom of testation will
relate not to the applicable standard of proof, but rather to the
scope of issues that have to be established.
C. How a Disinheritance Statute Would Help to Alleviate
the Under-Deterrence Problem
1. Advantages of a Disinheritance Statute over Existing Remedies
The analysis of existing remedies against interference with free-
dom of testation identified two partially related reasons for the
current problem of under-deterrence of this kind of wrongful be-
havior within American law: the burden of proof for claimants in
tort law and equity and the inadequate sanctioning that the existing
remedies impose.146 Both of these problems would at least partly be
alleviated by a disinheritance statute of the kind that has been out-
lined in the previous Section.
First, the fundamental advantage of a disinheritance statute over
constructive trusts and tort actions concerns the scope of facts that
have to be proven. For the disinheritance statute to apply, it only
has to be established that there was an interference with the dece-
dent’s autonomy. What need not be answered is the question of
how the decedent was planning to exercise his autonomy, i.e. whom
he would have designated as heir in absence of the wrongful act. It
is easy to imagine cases in which this could make a difference. A
145. Applying a more plaintiff-friendly standard of proof would in certain circumstances
allow disappointed heirs to circumvent the rules of the traditional remedies against interfer-
ence with freedom of testation. Such possibilities of circumvention already exist in cases
involving the interference tort and are heavily criticized. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note
11, at 365.
146. See supra Parts II.B–C.
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plaintiff might, for example, be able to establish that the wrong-
doer burned the decedent’s holographic will (case four), but not
be able to prove its content. He might be able to demonstrate that
the decedent was threatened into executing a certain will (case
one), but not be able to prove which provisions the testator would
have made in the absence of the wrongful act. Similarly, he might
be in a position to show that the testator was prevented from exe-
cuting a will (case five), but not be able to prove what kind of
disposition the testator intended to make. The reason for this diffi-
culty of proof with regard to the testator’s intent is straightforward
and has been described above as the “worst evidence problem.”
Whereas the act of interference is, at least to some extent, a “fact of
the outer world,” the testator’s intention is not. The very effect of
the interference is to prevent the testator’s true intent from materi-
alizing in the outer world. Thus, there will often be no sources to
establish the testator’s intent other than the testator himself; he,
however, will no longer be present at the time of the court proceed-
ing. Therefore, it seems almost an obvious solution that proof of
the interference be the sole requirement for a remedy to apply.
When it comes to deterrence, the second advantage of a disin-
heritance statute over the existing remedies against interference
with freedom of testation concerns the level of sanctioning. As
demonstrated, one problem of constructive trusts and tort actions
with merely compensatory damages is that the wrongdoer has
barely anything to lose; if he is caught and a successful action is
brought, he is at most stripped of the fruits of his wrongdoing. A
disinheritance statute works differently. It is not only the wrong-
doer’s gains that are taken away, but also any entitlements under
intestate succession or other parts of the will that were (potentially)
not affected by the interference.
To illustrate how this can in fact make a substantial difference,
let us imagine the following fact pattern: the wealthy and widowed
A has two sons—B and C—that would each be entitled to fifty per-
cent of her estate under the local intestacy statutes. A considers this
a fair distribution of her property and thus decides not to execute a
will. B, however, is unhappy with the mother’s decision and consid-
ers threatening her into executing a will under which he, B, would
be entitled to the whole of A’s estate.147 Under a legal system where
only will contests, constructive trusts, and tort actions (with com-
pensatory damages) are available to remedy interference of
147. For similar fact patterns showing the deficiencies of will contests, see Klein, Fourth
Circuit, supra note 13, at 266 (using an example with four siblings); Klein, First, Second, and
Third Circuits, supra note 13, at 247.
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freedom of testation, the avaricious B has a strong incentive to
move ahead with his plan. If his threat were discovered and a suc-
cessful action brought, he would still be allowed to keep half of his
mother’s estate, i.e. the portion he would have received under the
intestacy laws anyway. In contrast, under a legal system with a disin-
heritance statute, B would risk losing his fifty percent intestacy
share with this plan. Interfering with A’s freedom of testation would
thus entail significant expected costs that, ideally, would make the
whole enterprise unprofitable.148
2. Remaining Problems and Why a Bar from Inheritance
is Still a Good Solution
As demonstrated, enacting a disinheritance statute would sub-
stantially deter interference with freedom of testation. However, a
statute of the kind described would by no means completely solve
the problem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom of
testation. In fact, for two reasons, it is likely that the under-deter-
rence problem would remain substantial, even after the adoption of
such a solution.
First, even though a disinheritance statute causes fewer problems
of proof than the traditional remedies, the conditions for its appli-
cation are by no means easy to prove. Interference actions such as
will suppression, forgery, undue influence, fraud, and harassment
are typically not conducted openly. Therefore, proving the “outer
fact” of the interference action often can be almost as difficult as
proving the “inner fact” of the true intent of the testator. This is
particularly true in the case of undue influence where, as two com-
mentators put it, courts are facing the “profound difficulty of
reconstructing the subtle dynamics of familial and other close per-
sonal relationships.”149 These difficulties will in turn decrease the
likelihood of the disinheritance rule being applied and conse-
quently also diminish the risks of an interference action.
Second, and more importantly, with regard to potential interfer-
ors who would not receive anything from the decedent’s estate
absent their interference action, a disinheritance statute is an
empty threat. There are simply no benefits under succession law
from which they could be barred. If, for example, returning to the
148. It is important to note, however, that in many cases one will not know how A would
have crafted his estate plan if B had not interfered with his freedom of testation. After all, it is
not uncommon that testators change their estate plans at a late stage of their lives. For a
discussion of this aspect, see infra Part III.C.2.
149. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 344.
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previous example, A had already executed a will leaving his com-
plete estate to C, B would again have nothing to lose from
interfering with A’s autonomy because, absent the interference, he
would end up empty-handed anyway. It is worth pointing out that
this deficit in the deterrence effect of a disinheritance statute would
be significantly smaller if persons closely related to the descendant
were generally entitled to a fixed portion of his estate even against
the deceased’s wish. At least for them,150 then, there would always
be benefits that could be forfeited, and thus something to lose from
interfering with freedom of testation.151 American law contains such
provisions on “forced heirship” only to a comparatively152 limited
extent. With the exception of Lousiana,153 all American states allow
testators to disinherit their children;154 protection against inten-
tional disinheritance is only afforded to surviving spouses.155
Ironically—and with only slight exaggeration—by restricting the
testator’s freedom less than other jurisdictions, American law
makes it harder to deter interference with it.156
It is important to note, however, that the two qualifications with
respect to the effectiveness of a disinheritance statute do not,
strictly speaking, constitute arguments against its enactment. In par-
ticular, they do not contradict the conclusion that, both with regard
to issues of proof and the measure of sanctioning, a disinheritance
150. For interferors that are not closely related to the decedent, the existence of such
provisions would of course not make any difference. Regrettably, there are no empirical stud-
ies that investigate whether interference with freedom of testation is typically committed by
members of the decedent’s family or by outsiders.
151. This would of course require including such “compulsory portions” in the scope of a
disinheritance statute.
152. For an overview of the law on compulsory heirship in the different European legal
systems, see, e.g., Inge Kroppenberg, Compulsory Portion, in 1 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 337 (Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2012); cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 342 (noting that the absence of compul-
sory rules regarding a right of the decedent’s next-of-kin to inherit makes American law
unique among modern legal systems); Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Freedom of Testation in the United
States, in FREEDOM OF TESTATION / TESTIERFREIHEIT 143, 144–45 (Reinhard Zimmermann ed.,
2012) (contrasting the American rejection of the concept of forced heirship with the ap-
proaches in France and Germany).
153. Even in Lousiana, however, the protection of children against intentional disinheri-
tance has been limited in recent years. See Vincent D. Rougeau, No Bonds but Those Freely
Chosen: An Obituary for the Principle of Forced Heirship in American Law, CIV. L. COMMENTS., Win-
ter 2008, at 1, 2 (noting that a law that came into effect in 1999 in Louisiana gives parents
greater freedom from forced heirship once their children reach twenty-three years of age).
154. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 30, at 519.
155. See id. at 469–519.
156. The absence of forced estate entitlements in American law is sometimes also seen as
a reason for the fact that capacity litigation and allegations of undue influence are more
frequent in the United States than in Europe. See John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Con-
servatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 64–65 (1978) (pointing out that the typical plaintiff in
testamentary capacity litigation is the disinherited child, a figure unknown to European law).
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statute has substantial advantages over the existing remedies against
interference with freedom of testation. If enacted in addition to
these existing remedies, and not as a substitute, a disinheritance
statute will decrease the problem of under-deterrence of interfer-
ence with freedom of testation—even if it will most likely not fully
solve it. In this context, it is also noteworthy that other solutions
proposed in favor of protecting freedom of testation more effec-
tively would require much more radical and costly changes to
American law than the introduction of the proposed disinheritance
statute. In particular, the sometimes advocated introduction of an
“authenticated will,”157 as it exists in civil law countries,158 where a
notary determines that the testator has capacity and is free of the
controlling influences of others, would constitute a significantly
larger challenge in terms of institutional design.
D. Additional Arguments in Favor of a Disinheritance Statute
This Section will now present three additional arguments, be-
yond deterrence, in favor of the suggested solution that can be
found outside the instrumentalist logic applied so far.
1. A Wrongdoer Should not Benefit from His Wrong
The principle that was so powerfully articulated by the court in
Riggs—a wrongdoer should not benefit from his wrong—is one of
the most frequently cited justifications for slayer statutes.159 This
principle can also be used to justify a bar from inheritance in cases
of interference with freedom of testation wherever it is impossible
157. See, e.g., Leopold & Beyer, supra note 43, at 150–52; Nicole M. Reina, Note, Protecting
Testamentary Freedom in the United States by Introducing the Concept of the French Notaire, 22 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 427 (2003). For an account of the differences between civil law
notaries and U.S. notaries public, see also PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, THE CIVIL LAW
NOTARY—NEUTRAL LAWYER FOR THE SITUATION 114–19 (2010); Langbein, supra note 156, at
65–66; Scalise, supra note 30, at 95–99.
158. See Kenneth G. C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal & Reinhard Zimmermann, Testamentary
Formalities in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in 1 COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW: TESTA-
MENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 2, at 432, 448–49.
159. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 cmt. a (2011)
(“The law of unjust enrichment forecloses the possibility that a person might benefit from
committing a felonious and intentional homicide.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
& OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. a (2003) (“The principle of this section is that a
person who, without legal excuse or justification, is responsible for the felonious and inten-
tional killing of the decedent . . . is denied any right to benefit from the wrong.”); Fellows,
supra note 134, at 490.
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to reconstruct with reasonable certainty how the testator would
have devised his estate plan absent the wrongful interference.160 Af-
ter what has been said above about the “worst evidence problem,” it
is clear that this is not an insignificant group of cases.
To illustrate, consider a straightforward fact pattern, similar to
the one used earlier.161 Widower A has two sons—B and C—that
would each be entitled to fifty percent of his estate under the appli-
cable intestacy statutes. B threatens A into executing a will under
which he, B, would be entitled to the whole of A’s estate. B’s wrong-
ful action is discovered. In contrast to the earlier example, however,
this time it cannot be reconstructed how A would have distributed
his estate if B had not threatened him. He might not have executed
a will at all; he might have left everything to C, or to B (even though
that is unlikely); or he could have devised a totally different plan. If
a will contest were brought under such circumstances, A’s will
would be denied probate and intestacy rules would apply. Conse-
quently, B could still claim half of his father’s estate. Despite the
will contest, B would thus profit from his wrongdoing in all those
cases where A would have left him less than his intestacy share if B
had not threatened him.
Starting from the premise that an interferor should not profit
from his wrongful interference with the testator’s freedom of testa-
tion leads to the conclusion that the interferor should be barred
from inheritance in cases like the one just presented where the tes-
tator’s preferred estate plan is unknown. Of course, there is no way
to be sure that A was actually planning to disinherit B completely.
His plan may well have been to leave B half of his estate, or even
more. Thus, one might argue that the principle that no one should
profit from his wrong cannot justify a bar from inheritance in such
cases, given that it is impossible to know that such a disinheritance
would merely strip the interferor of the profits of his wrongdoing
instead of also taking something away from him that he would have
received even absent his wrongdoing. Such an argument, however,
would ignore the fact that, in a case like this, it was the interferor
himself who has created the situation where we cannot reconstruct
the testator’s true intent. If the true intent of a testator cannot be
established because of interference with freedom of testation, it is
fair that the resulting uncertainty be resolved at the expense of the
160. To avoid confusion, this is a different question from the one discussed in the previ-
ous paragraph where it was asked how the testator would have devised his estate if he had
had the chance to do so in full autonomy and with knowledge of the wrongful act of the
interferor. In this paragraph, by contrast, the question is what the testator would have done if
the wrongful act had never taken place.
161. See supra text following note 149.
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wrongdoer.162 Otherwise, the wrongdoer would profit from a situa-
tion that he himself wrongfully created. Thus, it seems reasonable
that the law should draw the adverse inference that the testator
would not have left anything to the interferor had he been able to
exercise his freedom of testation without interference.
2. The General Trend Towards a Behavior-Based Inheritance
Regime and the Theory of the “Expressive Function”
of Law
The last few years have witnessed an increasing number of U.S.
legal scholars advocating for inheritance rules that take the behav-
ior of presumptive heirs towards the decedent into account. Thus,
bars to inheritance on the basis of the following types of miscon-
duct have been proposed: domestic violence between spouses;163
physical and sexual abuse of minor children by their parents;164
abandonment of minor children by their parents;165 failure to sup-
port a minor child by his father;166 and domestic elder abuse.167
Authors of such proposals often refer to the fact that some state
jurisdictions and model codes already have certain fault-based bars
to inheritance. Examples of existing behavior-based inheritance
bars include statutes barring adulterous spouses from inheriting,168
162. The principle that wrongfully created uncertainty should be at the expense of the
wrongdoer seems to be well accepted in different areas of law. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. First City Fin.
Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he line between restitution and penalty is
unfortunately blurred, and the risk of uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal
conduct created that uncertainty.”); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 251 (2008) (explaining under what
circumstances courts draw adverse inferences from the wrongful destruction of evidence).
163. See Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW &
INEQ. 401, 412 (1995); Carla Spivack, Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance, 90
OR. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (2011); Thomas H. Shepherd, Comment, It’s the 21st Century . . . Time
for Probate Codes to Address Family Violence: A Proposal that Deals with the Realities of the Problem, 20
ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 449, 464–66 (2001).
164. See Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent, 40
U. RICH. L. REV. 547, 586–88 (2006). It should be noted, however, that the primary focus of
Brown’s article is to argue for a move from mandatory to discretionary disinheritance for
terminated parents.
165. See Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We
Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517, 537 (1994).
166. See Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49
U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 291–97 (1994).
167. See Lisa C. Dumond, Note, The Undeserving Heir: Domestic Elder Abuser’s Right to Inherit,
23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 214, 234–37 (2010).
168. As of 2011, there were five states providing for an inheritance bar on the basis of
adultery. See Spivack, supra note 164, at 272. For a similar overview as of 2007, see Rhodes,
supra note 132, at 978–79.
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statutes barring persons liable for physical abuse of an elder or de-
pendent decedent from inheriting,169 statutes barring parents who
abandoned their child from inheriting,170 statutes barring from in-
heritance on basis of spousal abandonment,171 and bars resulting
from a termination of parental rights.172
In support of these disinheritance statutes, three rationales are
particularly often brought forward: (1) deterrence;173 (2) realiza-
tion of the testator’s intent;174 and (3) the importance of the law
expressing social values by condemning certain behavior.175 The
relevance of the first of these arguments—deterrence—with regard
to the suggested solution to the interference with freedom of testa-
tion problem has already been addressed in detail.176 The value of
the second argument—the testator’s intent—will be addressed sep-
arately in the next Part.177
The third argument—that law should speak out against unac-
ceptable behavior—provides some support for the suggested
169. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2002); see also Spivack, supra note 164, at 274
(reporting that elder abuse bars inheritance in four states).
170. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a)(2) (2010) (barring a parent from inheriting
from a minor child if there is evidence that immediately before the child’s death the parental
rights could have been terminated on the basis of, inter alia, nonsupport, abandonment,
abuse, or neglect); see also Rhodes, supra note 132, at 982–85 (noting that eleven states cur-
rently have statutes that bar inheritance based on child abandonment and discussing the
history behind these statutes); Spivack, supra note 163, at 273 n.119 (citing state statutes that
bar inheritance based on child abandonment as well as other articles that discuss these
statutes).
171. For an overview of existing spousal abandonment statutes as of 2011, see Spivack,
supra note 163, at 273 n.118.
172. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a)(1) (2010) (barring a parent from inheriting
from a child if parental rights were terminated). But see Brown, supra note 164, at 552–57
(pointing out that not all of the statutes dealing with the termination of parental rights ex-
plicitly extinguish the right of the terminated parent to inherit and that some even explicitly
preserve the right). For a critique of a mandatory bar on inheritance in a case of a termina-
tion of parental rights, see id. at 569–81 and Spivack, supra note 163, at 270–71.
173. See., e.g., Monopoli, supra note 166, at 281–82; Preble, supra note 163, at 412; Du-
mond, supra note 167, at 215. But see Brown, supra note 164, at 560–61 (calling the notion
that the threat of losing inheritance rights will deter parents from abusing their child “fanci-
ful”); Spivack, supra note 163, at 259 (stating that it is unlikely that a bar on intestate
succession would deter many abusers).
174. See, e.g., Spivack, supra note 163, at 270. But see Monopoli, supra note 166, at 277
(doubting, on basis of child psychology, whether minor children would want their parents to
be barred from inheritance on the basis of abuse); Brown, supra note 164, at 561–62 (follow-
ing Monopoli’s argument with regard to presumptive child intent); Spivack, supra note 163,
at 284–87.
175. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 164, at 587; Monopoli, supra note 166, at 282; Preble,
supra note 163, at 412; Spivack, supra note 163, at 259–61; Shepherd, supra note 163, at
475–76.
176. See supra Parts III.C.1, III.D.1.
177. See infra Part III.E.2.
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disinheritance statute. After all, interference with freedom of testa-
tion is both disapproved of in society and harmful. Thus, it is fair to
conclude that succession law should clearly condemn such behav-
ior. The value of the theory of law’s “expressive function”178 is
disputed. With regard to inheritance rules in particular, it has been
argued that using law to make statements about the moral value of
certain behavior is neither legitimate nor efficacious.179 Against this
background, it might at least seem debatable whether succession
law should really take all sorts of misbehavior towards the decedent
into account and whether the trend towards a behavior-based in-
heritance regime is in fact a good development.
Irrespective, however, of what stance one should take in the de-
bate over a behavior-based inheritance regime, there are valid
arguments on either side for including a bar to inheritance on the
basis of interference with freedom of testation. If, on the one hand,
one believes that succession law should take into account misbehav-
ior towards the decedent, then it is a natural step to include
interference with the decedent’s freedom in the list of unaccept-
able behavior that acts as a bar to inheritance. If, on the other
hand, one is skeptical whether questions of domestic abuse, child
neglect, adultery, etc. should be addressed via succession law, there
is still reason to enact a disinheritance statute for interference with
freedom of testation because, in contrast to the aforementioned be-
havior, interference with freedom of testation is immediately
directed at the disposition of property upon death. Addressing it
within the frame of succession law thus seems a conceptually180
sound solution.
3. Comparison to Civil Law Systems
Including a section on “comparative law”181 in an argument for
law reform may generate skepticism. Even ardent proponents of
178. This theory is sometimes mentioned in support of a more behavior-based inheri-
tance regime. Cf. Anne-Marie Rhodes, Blood and Behavior, 36 ACTEC L.J. 143, 177 (2010);
Spivack, supra note 163, at 259–61. For an overview, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories
of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000), and Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
179. See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1054–58 (2004).
180. For an argument in favor of more conceptualism and doctrinalism in private law
scholarship, see John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1640, 1652–56 (2012).
181. For the purpose of this Section, the term “comparative law” is basically equivalent to
“the study of foreign law,” i.e. law from jurisdictions that are not part of the United States. In
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comparative legal scholarship acknowledge that, strictly speaking,
the study of foreign legal systems is of little normative value. Ulti-
mately, arguing that a certain rule should be adopted because other
jurisdictions have enacted it would mean deducing “an ‘ought’
from an ‘is.’”182
When it comes to justifying behavior-based bars from inheri-
tance, however, it has been a recurring pattern in U.S. legal
discourse to refer to civil law solutions. Thus, in Riggs v. Palmer, for
example, the court’s majority mentioned provisions in the French
Civil Code and Roman law in support of their decision to bar Elmer
from receiving his grandfather’s estate.183 Similarly, in the ongoing
debate about the desirability of a behavior-based inheritance sys-
tem, it is quite common for supporters of such a system to refer to
the civil law doctrine of “unworthiness to inherit.”184 Hence, it
seems that, at least within this context, there is a particular open-
ness in U.S. succession law discourse to comparative law
observations.
Therefore, it is helpful to point out that there is precedent in
other jurisdictions for the suggested solution of a bar from inheri-
tance on the basis of interference with freedom of testation. The
mentioned civil law doctrine of “unworthiness to inherit” works es-
sentially like a bar from inheritance185 and, thus, similarly to the
statutory solution proposed in this Article. In many civil law jurisdic-
tions, interference with freedom of testation constitutes the core
area of application of this concept.186 This makes it all the more
a different context, “comparative law” could of course also refer to the study of the different
U.S. state laws.
182. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 339, 373–74; see also John C. Reitz, How to Do Compara-
tive Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L., 617, 624–25 (1998).
183. See 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (“Under the civil law, evolved from the general
principles of natural law and justice by many generations of jurisconsults, philosophers, and
statesmen, one cannot take property by inheritance or will from an ancestor or benefactor
whom he has murdered. . . . Code Nap. § 727; Mack. Rom. Law, 530, 550.”); cf. Wade, supra
note 123, at 716 n.4 (referring also to the civil law doctrine of unworthy heirs in the context
of the debate on slayer rules).
184. Cf., e.g., Monopoli, supra note 166, at 259 n.8 (referring to a “[t]elephone conversa-
tion” with John Langbein about the concept of unworthiness of heirs in civil law); Rhodes,
supra note 165, at 530 (referring to the Roman bars from inheritance on the basis of “in-
dignitas”); Spivack, supra note 163, at 268 (referring also to Roman law).
185. For a concise historical and comparative account of this doctrine, see Reinhard Zim-
mermann, The Present State of European Private Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 505–08 (2009).
186. For Germany, see BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] I 122, as amended, § 2339, para. 1 (Ger.) (naming as grounds
for unworthiness to inherit, inter alia, the intentional, unlawful killing of the deceased, the
prevention of the execution or revocation of a will, the procurement of a will by deceit or
duress, and the suppression or forgery of a will). For the situation in other European jurisdic-
tions, see Zimmermann, supra note 185, at 505–06.
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surprising that U.S. authors, even though referring to this doctrine
when discussing the general possibility of behavior-based bars from
inheritance,187 have never discussed it as a potential model for deal-
ing specifically with the interference problem. That some civil law
jurisdictions already deploy a bar from inheritance on the basis of
interference with freedom of testation does not as such constitute
an argument in favor of adopting a similar solution in the United
States. It might, however, be of some value when it comes to dem-
onstrating that the suggested solution is not a legislative
experiment but rather has already been tested in practice.188
E. A Short Rebuttal of Possible Criticism of the Proposal
The proposal presented in this Article—sanctioning interference
with freedom of testation with a bar from inheritance—would in
effect mean that, from the perspective of succession law, a person
who unduly influences a testator is treated like a person that
murders him. Such a proposal is likely to be met with criticism.
Hence, the remainder of this Article anticipates possible critiques
and demonstrates how they can be rebutted.
1. Over-Deterrence?
Given that a major argument in favor of this proposal is its deter-
rence potential, a possible counterargument from within the
instrumentalist framework might be that the enactment of a disin-
heritance statute for interference with freedom of testation leads to
over-deterrence. However, interference with freedom of testation is
undesirable per se; the preferable level for this activity is zero.189
Consequently, when it comes to interference actions themselves, a
danger of over-deterrence does not exist. Even sanctions for per se
undesirable behavior can, however, create a problem of over-deter-
rence if there is a risk that courts might mistakenly classify socially
desirable behavior as the kind of behavior that triggers the sanc-
tion. With regard to most interference acts, the risk of such false
positives seems to be rather small. The chance, for example, that a
187. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
188. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 340, for a call for “modesty in top-down
reform of the common law through innovative . . . provisions that have not been tested in
practice or vetted in the literature.”
189. For an explanation of the undesirability of interference with freedom of testation
from a welfare-oriented perspective, see supra note 8.
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court would mistakenly believe that a will forgery has occurred
seems negligible.
With regard to undue influence, however, the risk of false posi-
tives cannot easily be brushed aside, given the noted difficulties of
applying the doctrinal concept of undue influence in practice.190 It
seems nevertheless doubtful that this creates a strong argument
against the suggested solution. For there to be a case against the
proposed solution, it would first have to be demonstrated that there
is a socially desirable activity, such as friendly interaction with the
decedent, on which the existence of a disinheritance statute has a
chilling effect. Second, it would also have to be demonstrated that
the welfare loss caused by over-deterrence after the enactment of a
disinheritance statute is in fact larger than the welfare loss caused
by under-enforcement in the absence of a disinheritance statute.
None of these requirements seem likely to be present.
2. Violation of Testator’s Intent?
The central goal of the proposed disinheritance statute is the
protection of the testator’s autonomy. Thus, the value of this propo-
sal would be seriously undermined if the proposed protection
mechanism—i.e. the bar from inheritance—were itself in conflict
with the testator’s intent.191 This would be the case if one could
convincingly argue that a testator whose freedom has been inter-
fered with would not want the interferor to be disqualified from
inheritance. A similar point is sometimes made with regard to slayer
statutes. Even if murdered by his designated heir, so the argument
goes, a testator would prefer the murderer not to end up empty-
handed.192
190. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at
391–92 (pointing out that increasing the sanctions for interference with freedom of testation
would “magnify the costs of error in policing the murky line between permissible persuasion
and impermissible overpersuasion”).
191. It should be pointed out, however, that even if such a conflict between the testator’s
intent and the bar from inheritance existed, it would not be impossible to justify the sug-
gested disinheritance statute by reference to the testator’s autonomy. After all, one of the
central ideas behind the proposed bar from inheritance is its deterrent effect. If potential
interferors are discouraged by the prospect of a bar from inheritance, the need for imposing
the sanction will not arise.
192. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25, 72 (2006) (“[P]arents might still wish their children to receive an
inheritance in [case they are murdered by them].”); John C. Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions,
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2002, at 1, 10 (“The very people whom I expect to inherit from
me . . . are the very people whom I would want to forgive and let them have my stuff in the
hopefully remote possibility that they were to murder me.”).
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Absent any empirical evidence, however, such references to the
hypothetical intent of the testator are drawn from mere specula-
tion.193 With regard to slayer statutes, the weakness of these
references is illustrated by the fact that the testator’s intent is in-
voked not only against, but also in favor of, such statutes. At the
moment of death, as some authors argue, the testator would have
most likely revoked his dispositions in so far as they benefited the
slayer.194 In that sense, a slayer statute would merely help to realize
the testator’s true intent. The same point could be made with re-
gard to the suggested disinheritance statute for cases of
interference with freedom of testation. After all, it does not seem
unreasonable to assume that a testator whose freedom has been in-
terfered with would have preferred not to leave anything to the
interferor if he had been able to make an autonomous disposition
with knowledge of the interference attempt.195 Given the common
sentiment that interference with freedom of testation is morally
wrong and demonstrates bad character, there is no reason to see
why this assumption should be less likely to be true than the as-
sumption that the testator would have left his disposition
unchanged even if he had been able to exercise his autonomy with
knowledge of the previous interference. In conclusion, one can
thus say that the hypothetical intent of the testator can at least not
be invoked against the suggested bar from inheritance for interfer-
ence with freedom of testation.
3. Unconstitutional Forfeiture?
A possible challenge to the suggested disinheritance statute
might also be brought on the ground that many state constitutions
193. Cf. Spivack, supra note 123, at 17 (criticizing the testamentary intent rationale for
slayer statutes and noting that “speculation and imagination are all we can use”).
194. See, e.g., Nili Cohen, The Slayer Rule, 92 B.U. L. REV. 793, 799 (2012); William M.
McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV. 65, 71 (1969); Isaac Ehr-
lich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 259
(1974); John V. Orth, Second Thoughts in the Law of Property, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 65, 75 (2006);
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 861 (1993);
Sneddon, supra note 126, at 103.
195. Admittedly, the justification of a bar from inheritance by reference to the testator’s
(hypothetical) intent would not work if, and insofar as, the forfeiture related to benefits that
the testator could not deny the wrongdoer anyway. This is the case with regard to benefits,
such as the elective share, that arise from mandatory family protection provisions.
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explicitly prohibit forfeiture of a criminal’s estate.196 Such an argu-
ment, however, would most likely not be successful, as the history of
the establishment of the slayer statutes demonstrates. Even though
some state courts originally refused to recognize the slayer rule on
the basis of the constitutional prohibitions of forfeiture,197 it seems
undisputed today that the standard slayer statute does not violate
such a constitutional prohibition.198 The rationale for this view has
already been spelled out in Riggs v. Palmer, where the majority
pointed out that the slayer rule “takes from [the wrongdoer] no
property.”199 A slightly more elaborated way of presenting this so-
called “owned interest rationale”200 would go as follows: technically
speaking, one can only forfeit something in which one holds a
property right; the mere expectation of an inheritance before the
decedent’s death does not constitute such a property right; thus, a
slayer statute that merely bars a slayer from acquiring property can-
not violate the prohibition on forfeiture.201 This rationale should
also apply to the disinheritance statute that has been proposed
above with regard to interference with freedom of testation.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, to analyze the ex-
isting remedies against interference with freedom of testation to
determine their ability to deter this kind of undesirable behavior
sufficiently, and, second, to demonstrate why a statutory bar from
196. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“[N]o conviction can work corruption of blood or
forfeiture of estate.”). For an overview of similar constitutional and statutory provisions, see
Fellows, supra note 134, at 538 n.147.
197. See, e.g., McAllister v. Fair, 84 P. 112, 113 (Kan. 1906) (“[It is not] easy to attribute to
the Legislature an intention to take from a criminal the right to inherit as a consequence of
his crime, since the Constitution provides that no conviction shall work a corruption of blood
or forfeiture of estate.”). For further references to similar decisions, see, e.g., Maki & Kaplan,
supra note 123, at 911 n.58.
198. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 134, at 544–45; Hennessy, supra note 126, at 171–73. But
see, e.g., Bradley Myers, The New North Dakota Slayer Statute: Does it Cause a Criminal Forfeiture?,
83 N.D. L. REV. 997, 1025 (2007) (arguing that a slayer statute that deprives the killer of any
interest in property held in joint tenancy with the victim constitutes a criminal forfeiture).
199. 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889); see also Hennessy, supra note 126, at 171–72.
200. This term seems to have been established by Fellows, supra note 134, at 540–42.
201. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187 cmt. c (1937); Hennessy, supra note
126, at 171–73; Wade, supra note 123, at 720. But see Fellows, supra note 134, at 542–45 (hold-
ing slayer statutes constitutional, but rejecting the “owned interest rationale” and proposing a
different rationale); Sneddon, supra note 126, at 106 (agreeing with the alternative interpre-
tation of Fellows); Julie J. Olenn, Comment, ’Til Death Do Us Part: New York’s Slayer Rule and In
re Estates of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1346 n. 24 (2001) (agreeing with the alternative
interpretation of Fellows).
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inheritance for interference with freedom of testation would en-
hance the deterrence of such behavior and also accord with
important principles underlying the law of succession.
The analysis of the existing remedies against interference with
freedom of testation in Part II leads to the conclusion that there is
currently under-deterrence of interference with freedom of testa-
tion. This problem results in particular from the following three
factors: (1) the inapplicability of will contests in many cases of inter-
ference with freedom of testation; (2) the insufficient degree of
sanctioning that all three available remedies—will contests, tort ac-
tions, and constructive trusts—provide; and (3) the difficulty of
proving the conditions for the application of constructive trusts and
tort actions. It has also been demonstrated that the problem of
under-deterrence cannot be solved merely by legislative modifica-
tion of the existing remedies.
Part III, therefore, suggests adopting a new remedy against inter-
ference with freedom of testation as a supplement to the existing
remedies. The suggested disinheritance statute would alleviate the
described under-deterrence problem, primarily because of two ad-
vantages over the existing remedies. First, it would not be necessary
to demonstrate how the testator would have exercised his freedom
of testation in the absence of the interference. Second, the bar
from inheritance would entail a sanction for many interferors and
thus solve the problem that they currently have little to lose from an
interference.
In addition to being advantageous from a deterrence perspec-
tive, a bar from inheritance helps to ensure that an interferor does
not profit from his wrongdoing in cases where, as a consequence of
the interference, it can no longer be established how the testator
would have devised his estate plan. Other factors also support the
conclusion that a bar from inheritance for interference with free-
dom of testation would fit well in the system of succession law: (1)
the general trend towards a behavior-based inheritance regime; (2)
the availability of similar solutions in jurisdictions outside the
United States; and (3) the fact that, within the United States, almost
all jurisdictions have already adopted bars from inheritance for the
problem of the “murdering heir”—a problem that, when viewed
conceptually, is essentially nothing other than a highly aggravated
form of interference with freedom of testation.
In sum, the proposal made in this Article aims to improve the
protection of freedom of testation in a way that is in line with the
established principles of the American law of succession. Acting on
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the proposal would allow legislators to address the ever more ur-
gent problem of interference with freedom of testation without
having to implement costly institutional reforms. While the pro-
posed disinheritance statute would not completely solve the
interference problem, it would still make a difference, given that it
would ensure that many potential interferors would have some-
thing significant to lose from violating another’s freedom of
testation.
